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This dissertation is composed of five chapters that investigate the extent and role of 
economic rent in distribution contracts between manufacturers and dealers.  
Manufacturers often devise contractual mechanisms that enable downstream dealers to 
earn economic rent. One such mechanism is the two-stage ordering process with quantity 
discounts used by MNCs and local enterprises operating in China and elsewhere. Chapter 
2 shows how, in theory, this ordering process enables manufacturers to determine 
indirectly the outcomes of downstream competition to be either Bertrand or Cournot, 
which in turn affects the economic rent earned by their dealers.  
In Chapter 3, I match the results of my theoretical model to the longitudinal data 
obtained from a leading Chinese manufacturer of a key computer accessory. I use the 
data to estimate unobserved final prices and thus the economic rent earned by each of its 
sixty dealers over a one-year period. I show empirically that the two-stage ordering 
process of this manufacturer leaves economic rent with its heterogeneous group of 
dealers.  
Chapter 4 looks at the role of economic rent, in conjunction with manufacturer’s 
supervisory effort, in enforcing desired yet non-contractible dealer marketing effort. 
Based on the institutional arrangements adopted by the computer accessory manufacturer, 
I find that the size of downstream economic rent and the manufacturer’s supervision
 x
intensity are used as complementary control instruments to induce non-contractible dealer 







Manufacturers are known to use multiple governance forms to manage their 
distribution channels (e.g., Celly and Frazier 1996; Heide 1994; Weitz and Jap 1995) 1. In 
long-term relationships between a manufacturer and its dealers, the upstream firm often 
uses both economic incentives and supervision as control mechanisms to coordinate 
marketing activities (e.g. Murry and Heide 1998; Wathne and Heide 2000). The logic, 
according to the self-enforcing contracts literature (e.g., Dutta, Bergen, and John 1994; 
Kaufmann and Lafontaine 1994; Klein and Murphy 1988, 1997; Lafontaine and Raynaud 
2002; Telser 1980; Wathne and Heide 2000) is that, when monitoring is costly, leaving 
economic rent for the dealers, combined with occasional supervision, can serve as an 
incentive that discourages shirking and encourages non-contractible promotional 
activities by dealers.  
To implement a self-enforcement based incentive mechanism, manufacturers 
could rely on vertical restrictions e.g., territorial restrictions (e.g., Dutta, Heide, and 
Bergen 1999), minimum resale price maintenance (e.g., Telser 1960), two-part tariffs 
involving fixed fee transfers like franchise fees (e.g., Kaufmann and Lafontaine 1994), or 
slotting allowances (e.g., Desai 2000; Shaffer 1991) to permit the dealers to earn supra-
                                                 
1  Henceforth, I  refer to the upstream and downstream channel members as a manufacturer and a dealer 
respectively. 
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normal profits. At the same time, to ensure that dealers behave and perform in desired 
manners, manufacturers expend supervisory efforts, for example, to establish the extent 
of compliance by measuring output and behavior (e.g., Bello and Gilliland 1998; Heide 
1994; Heide, Wathne, and Rokkan 2007; Stump and Heide 1996) and to direct dealer 
activities through assignments and instructions (Alchian and Demsetz 1972; Anderson 
and Oliver 1987).  
By taking advantage of the institutional knowledge and transactional data 
obtained from Computec2 – a leading local manufacturer of a key computer accessory 
sold in China – this dissertation examines explicitly the extent of economic rent and the 
role of such rent, in conjunction with supervision, in manufacturer-dealer relationships. 
 
1.1. Institutional Context 
I first consider the vertical arrangement that Computec relies upon. Computec 
uses a two-stage ordering process with quantity discounts. Hewlett-Packard, Toshiba, and 
other multinationals operating in China and elsewhere3 also use a similar two-stage 
ordering process with quantity discounts. Computec chose a channel arrangement 
involving independent dealers, without any exclusive dealing clauses to sell its product. 
The most distinctive feature of Computec’s channel is its sales and ordering process. The 
sales activities are organized into well-defined quarterly sales cycles which always 
consist of two distinct stages. In the first, or order-taking, stage, Computec announces a 
schedule of quantity discounts below the stated wholesale price. The dealers then pay in 
full for the quantities they “preorder” at a discount. In the second, or order-fulfillment, 
                                                 
2  To preserve confidentiality, I use the pseudonym Computec to refer to the manufacturer who provided 
the context and data used in this paper. 
3 Certain companies and industries (e.g., publishing, media sales)  in the U.S. also use similar arrangements. 
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stage, the manufacturer ships dealers’ preorders according to their delivery requests. 
Dealers also have the option of ordering additional quantities, but must pay the full 
wholesale price for such units. As orders are fulfilled, dealers compete in price and also 
provide value-added services such as pre-sale education and trade credit to second-tier 
retailers. These services allow dealers to differentiate their offering. Dealers may not 
return any unsold units for refunds. In field interviews, the top management at Computec 
believed that this channel arrangement has provided both flexibility and a “satisfying” 
amount of profits to dealers.  
At the same time, having compliant and focused dealers is critical for Computec 
to capitalize on the fast evolving Chinese economy. Computec supervises its dealers in an 
intensive manner to ensure desired behaviors and performance. For instance, Computec 
trains its dealer on product knowledge and directs and monitors dealers’ sales effort. The 
manufacturer also helps the dealer to organize local promotions, trade shows, business 
meetings, and works with them to locate and recruit new customers. Through these 
interactions, Computec further gathers market intelligence on both intra- and inter- brand 
competition. It is important to notice that, according to Computec, its supervisory effort is 
often received with the most cooperative behaviors from those dealers who are making 
good profits. This observation suggests that economic rent and supervisory efforts may 
be used in synergy to induce desired dealer services. 
 
1.2. Goals and Outline of Text 
This dissertation has three specific goals. In Chapter 2, I formally model 
Computec’s two-stage ordering process with quantity discounts and show how the 
 4
manufacturer’s choice of quantity discount affects downstream outcomes. Specifically, I 
show how, in theory, the ordering process enables the manufacturer to endogenously 
determine the outcomes of downstream competition as Bertrand or Cournot, and thus 
affect profits earned by its dealers. Chapter 3 then estimates empirically the amount of 
economic rent that Computec actually leaves with each of its different dealers. To do this, 
I link the specific two-stage mechanism to the longitudinal data obtained from Computec 
and use econometric techniques along the lines of those used in the New Empirical 
Industrial Organization literature (e.g., Reiss and Wolak 2005) to estimate the unobserved 
final prices of the dealers. These estimated prices, together with the cost information I 
collected, enable me to calculate the economic profit that Computec actually leaves with 
each dealer. Chapter 4 empirically investigates the complementarity between the amount 
of downstream economic rent and manufacturer’s supervision in enforcing non-
contractible dealer marketing efforts. Chapter 5 presents limitations and directions for 
future research.  
 
1.3. Potential Contributions 
My research makes important empirical and substantive contributions. First, my 
dissertation addresses a serious gap between theory and empirical research in vertical 
settings. Specifically, several empirical studies have used econometric techniques to 
demonstrate positive downstream price-cost markups; however, except Chintagunta 
(2002), who shows side payments are a component of retail margins, other studies are not 
based on a specific vertical arrangement and instead focus on inferring the extent of 
competition and/or market structure from estimated parameters (e.g., Chen, John, and 
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Narasimhan 2006; Kadiyali, Chintagunta, and Vilcassim 2000; Villas-Boas and Zhao 
2005; Villas-Boas 2007). As such, even when a positive markup is identified in some 
settings, its source remains unclear. My study, to the best of my knowledge, is the first to 
model analytically a specific channel arrangement and to link the features of this 
arrangement to field data for systematic empirical analyses on downstream markups.  
Second, my analysis of the 2-stage ordering process extends the literature on 
capacity-constrained price games (e.g., Kreps and Scheinkman 1983; Maggi 1996) to 
show that manufacturer’s production capacity constraint is not necessary for a two-stage 
game in which dealers choose their quantity orders and then price according to Bertrand 
to yield Cournot outcomes. I show that even without any production capacity 
commitment, the manufacturer can endogenously control the intensity of competition 
through an institutional arrangement.  
Third, in order to estimate prices and thus calculate rents, my estimation problem 
is quite different from most New Empirical Industrial Organization work in the sense that 
only data on dealer’s costs and quantities are available to me. Using longitudinal data, I 
show how the unobserved retail prices can be recovered. Specifically, to estimate the 
final retail prices, I begin with the demand side estimation using a fixed effect model in 
which the observed wholesale prices act as “proxy” for the final prices. Then, using the 
estimated slope of the demand function and the a priori inferred level of dealer-side 
competition from my analytic model and contract data, I specify a supply relation to 
calculate the final prices.  
Fourth, the significantly positive downstream profits I estimate suggest that the 
ordering process is a workable mechanism for generating economic rent downstream. 
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Showing the existence of downstream rent in the context of a non-franchise, non-
exclusive-territorial vertical channel also complements the evidence found in franchise 
chains (Kaufmann and Lafontaine 1994; Michael and Moore 1995). These findings are 
important since, according to self-enforcement theory, economic rent plays a vital role in 
contract enforcement.  
Lastly, although both the self-enforcement literature and canonical efficiency 
wage theory presume that economic rent and supervision are substitutes in vertical 
agreements, the exact nature of the interdependence between the two control instruments 
has not been empirically established (e.g., Becker and Stigler 1972; Klein and Murphy 
1988; Kaufmann and Lafontaine 1994; Shapiro and Stiglitz 1984; Wathne and Heide 
2000). For these to be complements (substitutes) means that increasing the intensity of 
one raises (lowers) the return of using the other (Milgrom and Roberts 1990)4. By using 
recently developed econometric methods that have been applied in organizational design 
studies (e.g. Arora and Gambardella 1990, Athey and Stern 2003, Novak and Stern 2007) 
and the data I collected from Computec, I find that economic rent and supervision are 
complements, rather than substitutes as presumed by existing theories, in encouraging 
dealers’ provision of marketing effort. To the best of my knowledge, my dissertation is 
the first empirical analysis to show the exact nature of the interdependence between 
economic rent and supervision and its effect on dealer’s marketing effort. This finding 




                                                 





The Effect of a Two-Stage Ordering Process on the Intensity of Downstream 
Competition  
2.1. Introduction 
In long-term relationships between a manufacturer and its dealers, the upstream 
firm often uses economic incentives as a control mechanism (e.g. Heide 1994). The logic, 
as argued in the literature on self-enforcing contracts (e.g., Dutta, Bergen, and John 1994; 
Kaufmann and Lafontaine 1994; Klein and Murphy 1988) is that, when monitoring is 
costly, leaving economic rent for the dealers can serve as an incentive that discourages 
shirking and encourages non-contractible promotional activities by dealers. To implement 
a self-enforcement incentive mechanism, manufacturers could rely on vertical restrictions, 
e.g., exclusive territories (e.g., Dutta, Heide, and Bergen 1999), minimum resale price 
maintenance (e.g., Telser 1960), or two-part tariffs involving fixed fee transfers like 
franchise fees (e.g., Kaufmann and Lafontaine 1994) or slotting allowances (e.g., Desai 
2000; Shaffer 1991) to permit the dealers to earn supra-normal profits. 
However, these vertical restraints can be costly or infeasible to implement. In turn, 
manufacturers wish to lower the intensity of downstream competition would look for 
alternative mechanisms. One such alternative mechanism that is used by multinational 
corporations like Hewlett-Packard and Toshiba in their distribution business in China, as 
well as publishing and media sales sectors in the U.S., is the two-stage ordering process 
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with quantity discounts. Consider the specific arrangement of the two-stage ordering 
process deployed by Computec. Computec chose a channel arrangement involving 
independent dealers, without any exclusive dealing clauses to sell its product. The most 
distinctive feature of Computec’s channel is its sales and ordering process. The sales 
activities are organized into well-defined quarterly sales cycles which always consist of 
two distinct stages. The first week of each quarterly sales cycle constitutes the order-
taking stage. Computec announces a schedule of quantity discounts below the given 
wholesale price and its 60 dealers pay in full for the quantities they want to “preorder” at 
a discount. Figure 1 shows the time line of the ordering process. The second, or order-
fulfillment, stage immediately follows the order-taking stage and last approximately three 
months. The manufacturer ships the scheduled preorders during this phase and dealers 
can order additional quantities. As orders are fulfilled, dealers compete in price and also 
provide other value-added services such as pre-sale education and trade credit to second-
tier retailers to differentiate their offering. In field interviews, the top management at 
Computec believed that this channel arrangement has provided both flexibility and a 
“satisfying” amount of profits to dealers which engage in non-contractible marketing 
efforts.  
<insert Figure 1 about here> 
This chapter formally models Computec’s two-stage ordering process with 
quantity discounts and shows how the manufacturer’s choice of quantity discount affects 
downstream outcomes. Specifically, I show how in theory the ordering process should 
enable the manufacturer to determine the intensity of downstream competition as 
Bertrand and Cournot and thus affect the profits earned by the dealers. The results 
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derived from this model will be linked to the longitudinal data obtained from Computec 
to estimate the unobserved final retail prices of the dealers in Chapter 3.5  
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2.2. reviews related research. I then 
formulate and solve the model of the two-stage ordering process with quantity discounts 
in Section 2.3. Section 2.4 concludes.  
 
2.2. Related Research 
Although neither Computec nor its dealers is capacity constrained, my analysis of 
the two-stage ordering process complements the literature on capacity-constrained price 
games initiated by Kreps and Scheinkman (1983). Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) show 
that when firms compete in prices after a prior stage of capacity building, the price and 
quantities arising in the subgame-perfect equilibrium can coincide, under specified 
circumstances, with one-shot Cournot competition. Maggi (1996) extends their work to 
the case of differentiated products and allows expansion of production capacity in the 
second stage.  
My analysis shows that manufacturer’s production capacity constraint is not 
necessary for a two-stage game in which dealers choose their quantity orders and then 
price according to Bertrand to yield Cournot outcomes. In particular I show that under the 
2-stage ordering process, if the manufacturer offers no quantity discount the downstream 
competition would be equivalent to that of a one-shot Bertrand game; in contrast, if the 
                                                 
5 In many sale-resale contexts (e.g., business-to-business sales), manufacturers do not know the actual 
downstream prices. Lack of appropriate tracking techniques or strategic unwillingness by the dealer to 
reveal prices are two potential reasons.   
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manufacturer offers a strictly positive discount the downstream competition would be 
equivalent to that of a one-shot Cournot game. 
 
2.3. A Model of the Two-Stage Ordering Process with Quantity Discounts 
Model Assumptions 
Consider a monopolistic manufacturer which sells its product to consumers 
through two competing but symmetric dealers. The manufacturer sets the quantity 
discount schedule in stage 0. In stage 1 – the order-taking stage – the dealers 
independently and simultaneously place their orders taking into consideration the 
wholesale price and the discount schedule. In stage 2 – the order-fulfillment stage, the 
manufacturer delivers the products to the dealers. Each dealer observes both amounts 
delivered and simultaneously sets his price. If demand for his product exceeds the 
preordered amount, the dealer must order more from the manufacturer at the 
undiscounted wholesale price. If demand falls short of the preordered amount, the dealer 
may not return the excess to the manufacturer for a refund; for simplicity, I assume that 
the dealers cannot store merchandise for sale in a subsequent cycle. Figure 2 describes 
the information structure and the decision sequence. I assume that there is no uncertainty 
in demand,6 that demand is common knowledge, and that both manufacturer and dealers 
maximize profits. I show how the two-stage ordering process can be summarized in 
reduced form by a static Cournot or Bertrand game, and I use this insight to show how 
the manufacturer can vary the intensity of downstream competition in the three-stage 
game by varying the discounts offered in stage 0. 
                                                 
6 Neither Computec nor the dealers I interviewed seem concerned about demand uncertainty. According to 
them, economic growth in the system is fast and predictable, and there are few demand shocks. 
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<insert Figure 2 about here> 
Let ki be the quantity ordered by dealer i in stage 1 (“preorders”).  Assume that he 
must pay (w – d ki) per unit preordered, where w and d are wholesale price and dollar 
discount per unit respectively7  This discount schedule which declines linearly with the 
amount preordered approximates Computec’s actual discount schedule. 8  
Common business practice keeps the list price (w) constant over a rather long 
period of time and I treat it as fixed in my analysis. I further assume that each dealer has a 
constant marginal cost of selling which is assumed to be zero. The manufacturer’s total 
cost of production is m·(k1 +  k2). All fixed costs are assumed to be zero. 
If dealer i sells qi units in stage 2, his “short-run” marginal cost of sales (qi for i = 
1, 2) then is: 
.kqfor            w         






Since the total cost to dealer i of selling qi units in stage 2 is kinked at qi = ki, the 
marginal cost is undefined there (the left and right marginal cost are 0 and w, 
respectively). At the beginning of stage 1, the total cost of preordering ki units is (w – d ki) 
ki; and hence (w – 2 d ki) is the “long-run” marginal cost. To simplify, I assume dealer i’s 
demand function to be: 
jiij i,i p bpaq)p(pD +−=≡  
                                                 
7 I assume that the manufacturer does not entertain orders so large that the net wholesale price drops to zero. 
Moreover, I assume that d is small enough to assure positive equilibrium prices. In fact, the upper bound of 
d is implicitly defined in the equilibrium Cournot price (See Appendix A). 
8 The linear discount schedule has been adopted by previous studies (e.g., Ingene and Parry 1995; 2004). It 
can be regarded here as an approximation of the multi-tier, all-quantity discounts that Computec uses. All 
unit-discount contracts are pricing arrangements in which the wholesale price on every unit purchased is 
lower when the purchase quantity is equal to or above some threshold (Kolay, Shaffer, and Ordover 2004). 
Multiple-tier discounts have multiple, rather than just one, levels of quantity thresholds that correspond to 
different wholesale prices. See Banerji (1990) and Kolay, Shaffer, and Ordover (2004) for models that 
involves single-tier all-unit discounts. 
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with 0 ≤  b < 1, i = 1, 2, and i ≠ j. b is the substitutability between the two dealers.9  
Stage 2: Dealers’ Pricing Decisions. 
I determine the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium by backward induction, 
beginning with stage 2 in Figure 2 and working backward through stage 0.  
In stage 2, the two dealers observe the amounts preordered (k1, k2) and engage in 
Bertrand competition. Each dealer chooses his own price given the inherited preorders 
and his conjecture about the price set by his rival. The situation from firm i’s perspective 
is depicted in Figure 3: 
<insert Figure 3 about here> 
Given dealer j’s price, dealer i faces a linear demand curve and consequently has 
a linear marginal revenue curve which declines at twice the rate. His marginal cost of 
selling less than he preordered is zero. His marginal cost of selling strictly more than he 
preordered is the undiscounted wholesale price (w). The profit-maximizing amount to sell 
(qi) occurs where marginal revenue and marginal cost are equal. 
The reaction function of  dealer i represents his profit-maximizing  price given the 
price set by his competitor. Dealer i’s  best price response, pi = Ri(pj, ki), is continuous 
and depends on i’s preorder but is independent of the preorder of dealer j. The best reply 
consists of three linear segments (in bold in Figure 4).  
<insert Figure 4 about here> 
Part 1: When dealer j sells at a low price, the demand for dealer i’s merchandise is 
weak and selling less than he preordered is profit-maximizing for him. This occurs if  the 
                                                 
9 A similar demand system is utilized in Ingene and Parry (1995). 
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marginal revenue curve of dealer i crosses his marginal cost curve to the left of  ki in 
Figure 3. In this case, his best response to  pi is:  




i += . 
Part 2: When dealer j sets an intermediate price, the demand for dealer i’s 
merchandise is further to the right and selling exactly what he preordered becomes profit-
maximizing.  This happens when the marginal revenue curve crosses the vertical segment 
of the marginal cost curve at qi = ki.  Define pi ≡ si(pj, ki). Thus, the optimal price the 
dealer i charged clears the quantity demanded qi exactly at ki, which can be derived 
directly from the dealer’s demand function: 
(2)      ijiji kp ba)k;(ps −+= . 
Part 3: When dealer j sets a high price, the demand for dealer i’s merchandise is 
so large that it is profit-maximizing for him to supplement his preorder even though 
Computec charges him the undiscounted wholesale price for the additional amount. This 
happens when his marginal revenue curve intersects the marginal cost curve to the right 
of ki. His best response to pi can be determined by maximizing his profit 
)iiiiiip k(qw)(pkp πmax
i
−⋅−+⋅= , where in calculating the quantity demanded dealer i 
anticipates that  pj is fixed. In this range, his best reply is: 









Any intersection of the two best replies constitutes a pure-strategy Nash 
equilibrium in the subgame indexed by the inherited  preorder pair (k1, k2). Since  the two 
best replies intersect exactly once, each of these subgames has a unique Nash equilibrium. 
To verify that the best replies intersect once, note that, for each preorder pair, the best 
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reply of dealer 1 in Figure 4 has a slope which is always strictly larger than 1 while the 
best reply of dealer 2 has a slope which is always strictly smaller than 1.10 Since the best 
reply of dealer 1 starts out below that of  dealer 2, the former best reply will eventually 
overtake the latter best reply and will never cross it again. 
This unique intersection can, however, occur on any of the three segments of each 
reaction function. Hence, depending on the preorder pair (k1, k2) inherited from the prior 
stage, nine qualitatively distinct types of behavior can arise in the Nash equilibrium in a 
price subgame: the best response of dealer 1 may be to sell (1) strictly less than, (2) 
strictly more than, or (3) exactly what he preordered and, at the same time, dealer 2 
himself may find any of these behaviors to be profit maximizing. 
Stage 1: Dealers’ Preorder Decisions 
As we have seen, the prices and sales in stage 2 depend on preorders in stage 1. It 
is straightforward to verify that, for any d > 0, no dealer will preorder so little in stage 1 
that purchasing more in stage 2 will be profit-maximizing; nor will either dealer preorder 
so much in stage 1 that leaving goods unsold in the stage 2 becomes profit-maximizing. 
Hence, although for arbitrary preorder pairs nine qualitatively distinct kinds of behavior 
may occur, for profit-maximizing preordering, only one type of behavior occurs in any 
subgame-perfect equilibrium: each dealer sells everything it preorders and nothing more.  
To prove that no firm will preorder less in the first stage than it sells in the second 
stage, assume the contrary. That is, assume one of the dealers,  dealer 1 for concreteness, 
preordered in the first stage less than he sells in the second stage. Then suppose in stage 1 
he marginally increased his preorder unilaterally by one unit. This would have no effect 
                                                 
10 In particular, the slope of the three segments for player 1 are 2/b, 1/b, and 2/b for b < 1 while the slope of 
the three segments for player 2 are b/2,b/1, and b/2. 
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on the price either dealer would charge in the second stage. Intuitively, dealer 2’s price is 
still best given dealer 1’s price since his marginal revenue and marginal cost curves in 
Figure 3 have not shifted. And dealer 1’s price remains best given dealer 2’s price since 
the only change involves an inframarginal shift to the right of the vertical segment of his 
marginal-cost curve – by assumption, to the left of the intersection point of the marginal 
revenue and marginal-cost curve. In terms of the reaction functions of Figure 4, dealer 2’s 
best reply would not shift. And the only part of firm 1’s best reply which would shift 
marginally is its middle segment. Since the intersection point, by assumption, is not on 
this middle segment but on the outer segment, the intersection point would not change. 
Since the two dealers will set the same prices even though dealer 1 marginally increased 
his preorder, dealer 1 would reduce the supplemental purchases by an offsetting amount. 
But this unilateral deviation is then always profitable for dealer 1 since he earns the same 
revenue but acquires the last unit at the discounted wholesale price instead of the 
undiscounted price. A parallel argument establishes that in any subgame-perfect 
equilibrium dealer 2 will never preorder so little in stage 1 that he would want to augment 
it in stage 2.  
It is equally straightforward to show that in an equilibrium no dealer will preorder 
more in the first stage than he sells in the second stage. For, assume the contrary. That is, 
assume that one of the dealers, dealer 1 for concreteness, preordered in the first stage 
more than he sold in the second stage. Consider a unilateral deviation where player 1 
preorders marginally less. This would not affect the pair of prices chosen in the second 
stage. To verify this, note that given p1, dealer 2’s marginal revenue and marginal cost in 
Figure 3 are unchanged and hence his behavior would be unchanged. Given p2, dealer 1’s 
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marginal revenue curve would also be unchanged and it would continue to cross the 
marginal cost curve to the left of the vertical segment at k1, which shifts locally to the left. 
In Figure 4, the best reply of player 2 would be unaffected and the only segment of player 
1’s best reply which changes is not where the two curves intersect. Hence, the unique 
intersection point would not change. By deviating, therefore, dealer 1 would sell as much 
as before and would earn the same revenue. However, his costs would fall since he would 
preorder less merchandise. A parallel argument establishes that dealer 2 will never 
preorder more in stage 1 than he sells in stage 2.  It follows that in any subgame-perfect 
Nash equilibrium the intersection of the two reaction functions in Figure 4 always occurs 
in their middle segments. For future reference, I summarize these results in the following 
lemma: 
Lemma 1. In any subgame-perfect equilibrium, if d > 0, ki = qi = Di (pi, pj), i = 1, 
2.11 
We have seen that neither dealer orders so much in the first stage that he cannot 
sell it in the subsequent stage nor so little that he will have to supplement his preorder in 
the subsequent stage. I now ask, for a given discount schedule, how the amount each 
dealer will preorder in stage 1 is determined. Each dealer will preorder simultaneously 
and each will have a conjecture about his rival’s preorder. Given kj, dealer i, i = 1, 2, 
knows that if he preorders any amount less than some threshold, minik he will be expected 
to supplement his preorder so the amount sold is unchanged. Hence, for any preorders 
below this threshold the second-stage prices are not expected to change. Similarly, dealer 
                                                 
11 Notice that at d = 0, preorders are indeterminate since both dealers are indifferent to preordering any 
quantity between 0 and qi.   
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i knows that if he preorders any amount more than some larger threshold, maxik ( ≥ 
min
ik ), 
he will be expected to sell an unchanged amount and to leave the remainder of the 
preorder unsold. Hence, for preorders above the larger threshold, the subsequent price 
will be unaffected. Given kj, dealer i’s smallest credible quantity minik and the associated 
maximal price maxip (for i=1,2) can be determined, along with dealer j’s price, by solving 
three equations: the two demand curves (with jj
max




ii k)p,p(D = ) 







= ) assuming that he acts as a Bertrand 
competitor with marginal cost w. Dealer i’s largest credible quantity , maxik and minimal 
price minip  (for i = 1, 2) can be determined in a similar way. Given kj, dealer i’s largest 
credible quantity maxik and the associated minimal price 
min
ip  (for i = 1, 2) can be 
determined, along with dealer j’s price, by solving three equations: the two demand 
curves (with jj
min




ii k)p,p(D = ) and the best reply of dealer i  






= ). Given any ]k,k[k maxj
min
jj ∈ , larger preorders by dealer i will result in a 
lower price when ]k,k[k maxi
min
ii ∈ . The resulting price (pi) can then be determined by 
setting the two demand functions respectively to dealer i’s chosen preorder (at ki) and to 
the his conjecture about the preorder of dealer j. 
The situation confronting dealer i can be depicted graphically as follows: 
<insert Figure 5 here> 
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If the marginal-cost curve has a shallow slope (MC’), then dealer i’s optimal preorder is 
min
ik . If the marginal- cost curve has a steep slope (MC), then his optimal preorder is 
)k (k maxii <  and occurs where the marginal-revenue curve intersects the marginal-cost 
curve. In the latter case, his optimal preorder is larger when the discount (d) is larger.   
For any d > 0, there exists a unique pair of preorders in the first stage, each of 
which is optimal given the other. Suppose d induces each dealer to preorder an amount 
much larger than his minimal preorder. If Computec had a smaller discount (d), each 
dealer would reduce his preorder and hence each would charge a higher price  in the 
second stage. Eventually d can be reduced to the point where each dealer is preordering 
its minimal amount (respectively, minik and 
min
2k ).  If Computec reduced the discount any 
further, its dealers would each recognize that preordering even less would leave prices in 
the last stage unchanged. Hence, each dealer would continue to preorder his minimum 
amount. 
 Hence, as d is reduced exogenously, the equilibrium price pair in Figure 6 moves 
up until it reaches point B. At that point, each dealer is preordering the minimum amount 
and further reductions in d do not alter the equilibrium.  
As we will see, both the Bertrand and Cournot prices play important roles as 
benchmarks in the characterization of the subgame-perfect equilibrium of the three-stage 
game. The Bertrand price pair, denoted as ( (w)p (w),p B2
B
1 ), i.e. point B in Figure 6, is 
obtained by solving w);(pr 2
B
1 and w);(pr 1
B
2 . Appendix A reports the closed-form 
solutions of the Bertrand outcomes, as well as other solutions derived in the remaining of 
this subsection.  
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The Cournot price for dealer i is the price that corresponds to the quantity that 
solves the maximization problem for the dealer given his rival j’s quantity. Assuming the 
rival’s quantity to be fixed at kj, the corresponding Cournot price response function, 
)k 2dw;(kr ij
C
i − , for dealer i is given by the solution to the following constrained 
maximization problem: 
(4)  )p bp)))(ap bp(a  d(w(p πmax jijiiip
i
+−+−−−= , subject to 
        ijj p bpak +−= . 
The intersection of )k 2dw;(kr ij
C
i − and )k 2dw;(kr ji
C
j −  provides the Cournot 




1 −− ), or point C in Figure 6.  
For d above some threshold, the equilibrium remains at A (which itself is a 
Cournot price pair). For d smaller than the threshold but not too small, the equilibrium 
price pair lies on the diagonal line AB. C is such a point. As d decreases from that 
threshold, the average net wholesale price to the dealer increases and hence amounts of 
preorders decrease. In Figure 6, this implies s1 shifts downwards and s2 upwards. As a 
result, C moves towards B along the diagonal line in the center parallelogram until it 
reaches B. I call the largest d inducing the price pair at B the critical discount and denote 
it as δ. δ is implicitly defined in (w)p )k δ 2(wp Bii
C
i =− . The uniquely feasible critical 





=  (see Appendix A for proof). This is where the price 
outcomes shift from Cournot to Bertrand. At d = 0, preorders at the first stage are 
indeterminate but the sales quantities and prices in the second stage are determinate. The 
following lemma formally states this result. A proof is included in Appendix B.  
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Lemma 2:  The price, quantity, and profit for the dealers in the quantity subgame 
depends on the quantity discount chosen by the manufacturer. If the manufacturer offers a 






, then the subgame-perfect prices, 
quantities, and profits for the dealers are given by: 
Prices: 
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the subgame perfect prices, quantities, and profits for the dealers are given by: 
 



































If the manufacturer offers zero quantity discount, i.e.  d = 0, then the subgame 
perfect prices, quantities, and profits for the dealers are given by: 
Prices: 
b2
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The intuition for the results is as follows. In this game, the size of the preorders 
fundamentally determines the outcomes of competition. If the preorders are small, each 
dealer will realize that the rival will place additional orders in stage 2.  In this 
circumstance, the threat to sell only the preordered quantity is not credible. Consequently, 
the equilibrium price and quantity of the two-stage game would be the same whether or 
not dealers could observe the quantity preordered by the rival in stage 1. Hence, the 
price-quantity pair arising in the equilibrium of the two-stage game must coincide with 
that of a one-stage game where prices are chosen simultaneously by firms with marginal 
cost w. I refer to this as the “Bertrand regime”. 
In contrast, if the preorders are larger, each dealer realizes that the rival has no 
incentive to supplement his preorder. Here, the threat to sell no more than the preordered 
quantity is credible and the price-quantity pair arising in the equilibrium of the two-stage 
game must coincide with that of a one-stage game where preordered quantities are chosen 
simultaneously by firms with decreasing marginal costs (w – 2d ki). I refer to this as the 
“Cournot regime”12. Whether preorders are large or small depends on the magnitude of 
the manufacturer’s discount. If it is very small, the amount preordered is sufficiently 
small so that Bertrand outcomes ensue; if it is sufficiently large, the amount preordered is 
sufficiently large so that Cournot outcomes ensue.  
                                                 
12 Baye and Ueng (1998) show that in an alternating-moving price game with differentiated products, the 
steady-state Markov equilibrium prices are strictly higher than one-shot Bertrand prices. This commitment 
effect is true even for an infinite number of periods.  
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Stage 0: Manufacturer’s Choice of Discount  
The manufacturer’s problem in stage 0 is to choose an optimal quantity discount such that 
its profit is maximized: 
2211m0d
k)k dmw(k)k dmw( max −−+−−=π
≥
. 
As I show below, the discount that maximizes the manufacturer’s profit, namely the 
optimal discount d*, is either zero or strictly larger than the critical discount, δ. For 0 ≤ d 
< δ, the highest profit for the manufacturer is always at d = 0 (which generates Bertrand 
profit for the manufacturer), since in this regime dealers will not reduce preorders as the 
discount is lowered. I denote the corresponding quantity discount and manufacturer’s 
profit as *Bd and 
B
mπ  respectively. For d > δ, the equilibrium outcomes are Cournot. I 
denote the Cournot optimal discount and profit for the manufacturer as *Cd and
C
mπ . The 
manufacturer compares its Bertrand profit Bmπ  and the Cournot profit 
C
mπ and chooses the 
discount, i.e. either at zero or at *Cd , that gives it a higher profit. The corresponding 
discount is the optimal discount, d*. Table 1 summarizes the algebraic expressions of 
these solutions. Therefore, in the two-stage ordering process, I have established the 
following lemma: 
 Lemma 3: In the two-stage ordering process, (1) if the manufacturer chooses d* = 





= ; (2) if the manufacturer chooses d* =  *Cd in stage 0 such 
that *Cd > δ , then downstream competition is in the Cournot regime and the 










In this chapter, I modeled the two-stage ordering process adopted by various 
manufacturers and industry sectors. In this game theoretic model, the manufacturer offers 
quantity discounts to induce downstream dealers to preorder in the first stage and then the 
dealers compete in price in the second stage. As I have shown, the two-stage ordering 
process enables the upstream firm to control the intensity of downstream competition and 
thus affect the profits earned by its dealers. Specifically, under such arrangements, if the 
profit-maximizing manufacturer chooses a strictly positive discount, the downstream 
market will have Cournot outcomes even though dealers price by Bertrand in the second 
stage. If the manufacturer offers a zero discount, then the outcomes of downstream 
competition must be Bertrand.   
With these analytical results on hand, I can link them to the data collected from 
Computec. The linkage enables me to estimate unobserved final prices and thus calculate 
the amount of economic rent earned by its dealers. Chapter 3 illustrates the econometric 
technique and estimates the amount of downstream economic rent left by the 
manufacturer. As we will see, the two-stage ordering process is an effective and workable 









In this chapter, I estimate the economic rent that Computec actually leaves with 
its heterogeneous group of dealers. To do this, I link the specific two-stage mechanism to 
the longitudinal data obtained from Computec and use econometric techniques along the 
lines of those used in the New Empirical Industrial Organization literature (e.g., Reiss 
and Wolak 2005) to estimate the unobserved final retail prices of the dealers. However, 
my estimation problem is quite different from most New Empirical Industrial 
Organization work in the sense that final prices are not observed, but only data on 
dealer’s costs and quantities are available to me13. Using longitudinal data, I show how 
these unobserved retail prices can be recovered. Specifically, to estimate the final retail 
prices, I begin with the demand side estimation using a fixed effect model in which the 
observed wholesale prices act as “proxy” for the final prices. Then, using the estimated 
slope of the demand function and the a priori inferred level of dealer-side competition 
                                                 
13 In many sale-resale contexts (e.g., business-to-business sales), manufacturers do not know the actual 
downstream prices. Lack of appropriate tracking techniques or strategic unwillingness by the dealer to 
reveal prices are two potential reasons.   
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from my analytic model and actual contractual data, I specify a supply relation to 
calculate the final prices.  
By linking the two-stage ordering process to Computec’s data, I addresses a 
serious gap between theory and empirical research in vertical settings. Specifically, 
several empirical studies have used econometric techniques to demonstrate positive 
downstream price-cost markups; however, these studies are not based on a specific 
vertical arrangement and instead focus on inferring the extent of competition and/or 
market structure from estimated parameters14. As such, even when a positive markup is 
identified in some settings, its source remains unclear. Differently, my study models 
analytically a specific channel arrangement and links this arrangement to assembled field 
data for systematic empirical analyses on downstream markups. Moreover, the positive 
downstream profits I estimate suggest that the ordering process is a workable mechanism 
for leaving economic rent downstream. Finally, empirically showing the existence of 
downstream rent in the context of a non-franchise, non-exclusive-territorial vertical 
channel complements the evidence found in the franchising literature (Kaufmann and 
Lafontaine 1994; Michael and Moore 1995).  
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 links the analytical results 
derived in Chapter 2 to Computec. Section 3.3 presents the data. Estimation methods are 
presented in Section 3.4. Section 3.5 summarizes results. Finally, Section 3.6 concludes. 
 
                                                 
14 An exception is Chintagunta (2002), who shows side payments are a component of retail margins. 
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3.2. Linking Computec and the Two-Stage Ordering  Game 
As we can see from Figures 1 and 2, Computec’s channel arrangement essentially 
mirrors the two-stage ordering game. This close resemblance between theory and 
institution enables me to test for consistency between some observable implications from 
the theory model and corresponding facts from Computec’s channel.  In particular, I 
observe a match on two critical aspects that enable me to deduce the type of downstream 
competition between the dealers. 
Specifically, Lemma 3 suggests that under the 2-stage game, the manufacturer 
should either offer zero or positive discounts, and if they offer positive discounts the 
downstream competition would be Cournot.  Lemma 1, in turn, suggests that whenever 
discounts are positive neither dealer will order additional units in stage 2; in essence they 
would set prices so demand equals the amounts preordered. The data obtained from 
Computec (details in next section) shows support for both propositions.  First, Computec 
always offers positive discounts to its dealers using the 2-stage ordering process.  Second, 
throughout my longitudinal data over four sales cycles, none of the 60 dealers 
supplemented its order in stage 2 at the undiscounted wholesale list price. This suggests 
that dealer preorders constitute a credible commitment not to order more. Based on this 
match between theory and observation I infer that the downstream competition between 
dealers is most likely in the Cournot regime. 
Why does this inference matter?  I use this inference on the outcomes of game 
being played by the dealers (Cournot) to a priori setup my econometric specification that 
estimates the unobserved retail prices, the price-cost markups and economic profits 
earned by the dealers. My approach contrasts and complements with the NEIO-based 
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work on this topic. Specifically, existing studies estimate a “conduct parameter” from 
data and use it to infer ex post the type of competition and/or vertical game being played.  
As Reiss and Wolak (2005, pp.49-52) argue, however, even when positive markups are 
identified using this approach, they typically cannot be tied back to a specific rent-
generating arrangement or market structure.  In contrast, rather than estimate the conduct 
parameter from data, I use my theoretical analysis of the observed institutional structure  
to set the conduct parameter a priori and then estimate the markups.  This approach 
enables me to tie the estimated markups to the specific vertical arrangement set by the 
manufacturer. I turn to this task below.  
 
3.3. Data 
The proprietary data were collected onsite at Computec’s headquarters in China. 
The relevant period of the data is from December 2004 to November 2005, covering a 
period of twelve months. The data contain transactional details such as quantity discount 
schedules, wholesale prices, quantities, and marketing expenses. In the twelve month 
period of my data, there were four quarterly sales cycles. The data on quantity discounts 
and wholesale prices are quarterly whereas those on quantities and marketing expenses 
are monthly. Those monthly data allow me to exploit the variations arising from 
seasonality. I also secured data on Computec’s marketing expenses on advertising, public 
relations, and other promotional activities. This data is available at the national, regional, 
and individual dealer levels. I could not get data on marketing expenses spent by dealers 
themselves, but company officials believed such amounts were minimal. I conducted 
personal interviews that provided background information on the industry, business 
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practices, and distributional and contractual arrangements15. Tables 2 and 3 provide the 
descriptive statistics and pairwise correlations, respectively.  
<Insert Table 2 about here> 
Note that for confidentiality purposes, all prices, costs/expenses, and quantities have been 
re-scaled. A fictitious monetary unit, Y$, is created as a result of the rescale. The 
following is the descriptions of the variables:  
• Monthly quantity: monthly quantity delivered to the dealer.  
• Wholesale price: dealer’s wholesale price transacted with Computec, net of 
quantity discounts.  
• Net wholesale market prices of competing manufacturers: selling prices of 3 
direct competing manufacturers’ products in the wholesale market in Beijing. 
These are monthly prices. Beijing is the largest wholesale market of computer 
related products in China and has the lowest wholesale market prices in the nation. 
A total of twelve observations, which are dealer-invariant, were obtained.  
• Advertising expenses at national level: Computec’s monthly advertising expenses 
in national media. There are twelve data points which are also dealer invariant. 
• Public relations (PR) expenses at national level: Computec’s monthly expenses on 
public relation activities such as press conference, exhibitions, and media 
relations. Twelve dealer-invariant observations were collected.  
• Marketing expenses at regional level: marketing expenses such as outdoor 
displays, dealer conferences, display materials for retail outlets, and other 
                                                 
15 To obtain a more comprehensive and independent view on the industry in China, I also interviewed two 
industry observers during the data collection period.  
 29
promotional activities that Computec spends in a specific region. Multiplying 
eight regions by twelve months gives us 96 possible observations.  
• Manufacturer’s subsidy at dealer level: marketing dollars allocated to the dealer, 
i.e., the amount of expenses that Computec spends on a particular dealer on 
marketing activities such as outdoor displays, dealer conferences, display 
materials for retail outlets, and other promotional activities16.  
<Insert Table 3 about here> 
 
3.4. Estimation Technique 
To calculate the amounts of economic rent earned by Computec’s dealers, I need 
information on prices, costs, and quantities. When company data are available, this 
economic rent can be calculated directly (e.g., Kaufmann and Lafontaine 1994). In the 
case of Computec, I do not have data on final prices; only dealer’s costs and quantities, 
where final price refers to the price at which Computec’s dealer sells the product to 
second-tier retailers and/or consumers. As a result, my estimation problem is quite 
different from that observed in most New Empirical Industrial Organization work in 
which information on marginal cost, not final price, is usually unknown. Hence, I have to 
develop a procedure to recover these unobserved retail prices. Specifically, to estimate 
final retail prices, I begin with demand estimation using a fixed effect model in which the 
observed wholesale prices act as a “proxy” for the final prices. Then, using the estimated 
slope of the demand function and the a priori inferred type of dealer-side competition 
                                                 
16 Nonetheless, Computec often overcompensates dealers on these marketing activities. Unfortunately, I 
could not obtain any estimates from the company on the overcompensated amounts. As a result, any 
positive effect of such subsidy on dealer sales would be overestimated. See also Section 4.4 and 4.5.  
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from my analytic model and actual contract data, I specify a supply relation to calculate 
the final prices. 
To estimate the unobserved final prices, I use a linear demand specification that is 
frequently used in estimating structural models (e.g., Dube and Manchanda 2005; 
Kadiyali 1996; Roy, Hanssen, and Raju 1994).  Specifically, the linear demand function 
for the product sold by dealer i at time t is taken to be:   












+− i ≠ j,  
where qit is quantity demanded, pit is own final price, p-i,t is the average final price of i’s 
rival dealers located in the same region, ritp  is a vector of final prices for the three 
competing brands sold by dealer i, Xit is Computec’s subsidy on dealer i, mtX  is a vector 
of Computec’s national-level advertising and public relations expenses and regional-level 
marketing expenses, Xi is a vector of dealer time invariant characteristics such as the 
number of retail outlets and dealership tenure, α’s are demand parameters to be estimated, 
and εit is the error term17. The coefficients of pit and the p-i,t represent own-price effect 














1p , where Ng is the number of dealers located in region g 
(Bresnahan 1987, p.1046; Wooldridge 2002, p.331). 
Since pit , p-i,t and the ritp ’s are unobserved, I cannot directly estimate (5). To solve 
this problem, I take advantage of the longitudinal nature of my data and use a fixed-effect 
                                                 
17 Like previous studies (e.g., Chintagunta and Desiraju 2005, Sudhir 2001), I lack data on the full set of 
marketing expenses; hence I assume that the marketing expenses of the competing brands are absorbed by 
dealer- specific, time-invariant characteristics. Nevertheless, the inclusion of the marketing expenses by the 
focal brand (Computec) in my specifications improves my estimation by significantly reducing the (own) 
price endogeneity problem (Chintagunta 2002, Lal and Narasimhan 1996).  
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model along with the following assumptions on individual dealers’ mark-ups. First, for 
competing manufacturers’ products, I assume that each dealer adds a dealer-specific 





it θpp += . Second, I write the unobserved own price as a function of wholesale 
price and its associated dealer-specific markup, δi: iitit δωp += , where ωit is the after-
discount or net wholesale price. This additive, rather than multiplicative, specification of 
dealer markups has been used previously (e.g., Kadiyali et al 2000) and more crucially 
for me, fits the pricing rules used by dealers. Indeed, my field interviews revealed that the 
dealers markup their costs by a fixed amount, and not by a percentage. Using the additive 
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Second, the markups, which can be viewed as a measure of a dealer’s pricing power, are 
also time invariant. Again, I believe this is reasonable because my field interviews 
revealed that the number of dealerships used by the leading manufacturers is fairly stable. 
I do not restrict the relative magnitude of riθ ’s and δi; this allows the dealers to add 
different markups for different brands. Substituting the three expressions of final prices 
into (5), mean-differencing the transformed question to remove the markup terms and 
other time-invariant variables, and adding a sales cycle intercept, τ, to capture any time-
trend effects gives: 
























Note that this specification removes any potential omitted variable bias caused by 
unobserved markups which are correlated with prices and marketing activities (e.g., Lal 
and Narasimhan 1996). Renaming the transformed variables, I then estimate: 












+− .  
Note that the mean-centered wholesale prices, itω&& , are uncorrelated with the 
demand errors, itε&&  (Berry 1994), which is further supported by the results of endogeneity 
tests. I also tried semi-log and log-log demand specifications and found similar fit to data 
relative to the linear specification in (5’). To take into account of regional differences, I 
incorporate an interaction of itω&& with the regional dummies to obtain estimates of region-
specific dealer-level slopes of demand, namely 1gα̂ . Region-specific estimates of peer-
effect and Computec’s subsidy on a specific dealer are obtained similarly. Nevertheless, I 
do not use regional dummies to interact with cross-brand prices and regional- and 
national-level marketing expenses because of their limited numbers of observations (see 
Table 2)18. The estimated region-specific slopes of the demand function, 1gα̂ ’s, are used 
in the supply side formulation to compute the unobserved final prices.  
First-order condition of dealer’s profit maximization yields the following price-
cost markup relation: 
(6)  )p,p,(pq 
)p,p,q(p
p





−= ,  
                                                 
18 Although there are a total of ninety-six possible observations for regional-level marketing, Computec 
does not have any regional expenses in most of the months, which makes the “effectual” number of 
observations quite small.  
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where MC(·) is the marginal cost function, q(·) is the dealer’s demand function which 
takes both intra- and inter-brand competition into account, and λit is the conduct 
parameter for intra-brand competition. The partial derivative with respect to own quantity 
on the right hand side of (6) is the inverse of the slope of the individual dealer’s demand 
curve. However, because of my short-panel, I cannot estimate dealer-specific slope of 
demand, but only region-specific slope of demand for a representative dealer located in 
that region. I account for such limitation in calculating individual dealers’ final prices by 
assuming a dealer’s markup equals to the markup of the representative dealer located in 
the same region (e.g. Reiss and Wolak 2006). With downstream Cournot outcomes, i.e. 
λit = 1 for all i’s and t’s (Bresnahan 1989), assuming the discounted wholesale price, ωit 
to be the only marginal cost, and approximating an individual dealer’s markup with the 
average markup corresponding to his located region, I can calculate the final price, itp̂ , 
for all dealer i’s in region g, as: 








where 1gα̂ is the slope of the demand function in region g, Ng the number of dealers in 
region g, and Qgt is the aggregate regional quantity in month t. This formulation of final 
prices results in a pattern of regional-level price dispersion that is equivalent (to be 
precise, affine-transformed) to that of dealers’ net wholesale prices, which clearly 
requires an assumption about the nature of intra-brand competition in that region. That is, 
large dealers sell at lower prices than smaller ones because the former has lower average 
wholesale prices while the latter has higher average wholesale prices. This can be 
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justified by the institutional fact that these two types of dealers focus on different 
customer segments: wholesale for the large dealers versus retail for the small dealers.  
On the other hand, note that my measure of marginal cost in (7) follows a more 
precise definition per economic theory and excludes costs that do not vary with each 
additional unit sale (e.g., Pindyck and Rubinfeld 2001). As such, I assume that 
employees’ wages are short-run fixed costs and thus, the marginal selling cost is 
negligible. My field interviews revealed that almost all the sales people hired by dealers 
are paid by either pure salary or a combination of fixed salary and semi-annual or annual 
bonuses based on company-wide profitability; hence, a sales person’s incentives are not 
set at the unit margin. Moreover, dealers usually do not offer overtime pay even if their 
sales people work overtime occasionally; instead such overtime work effort by sales 
people is taken into account for the bonus considerations.  
Finally, I calculate the gross and net economic profit earned by dealer i over the 













i Fq)ω-p̂(Π −⋅= ∑
=
  
respectively, where Fi includes employee salary/wages, the entrepreneur’s opportunity 
cost of time (proxied by their second-best job), and the office/outlet rental charges. The 
first two items may be categorized as short-run fixed costs; and as discussed above, not 
part of the marginal cost. According to company officials, other expenses such as utility 
bills are negligible. I exclude tax- and interests- based expenses in (8); hence, the Πi‘s can 
be thought as pre-tax and pre-interests economic rents. Specifically, information on 
wages of computer engineers and those of wholesale/retail workers were collected from 
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China Provincial Statistical Yearbooks (2005, 2006)19 while dealers’ rental fees were 
provided by regional managers. I assume that the opportunity cost of the entrepreneur’s 
time equals a computer engineer’s wage in that corresponding city because computer 
engineers were among the highest paid jobs across all the occupations that were surveyed 
by the Statistical Yearbooks. Since the employees of Computec’s dealers engage in 
wholesale and/or retail business in the computer industry, I assume that their 
compensation is equal to the mean wage of the computer engineers and wholesale/retail 
workers. The total employee wage expense of a dealer is then calculated by multiplying 
this wage by the number of sales people and technical support staff he hires. The sum of 
the entrepreneur’s opportunity cost, employee wages, and rental fees is lastly weighted by 
the share of dealer’s total business that is Computec’s sales to obtain the dealer’s fixed 
costs incurred for selling Computec’s product.     
 
3.5. Empirical Results 
Table 4 summarizes the results from the pooled demand estimation. In order to 
control for intra-brand competition or peer effects, in column 2 I include the average 
own-brand price of competing dealers that are co-located in the same region as dealer i.  
As expected, the demand function is negatively sloped, and intra-brand and inter-brand 
competition show positive substitution patterns. National and regional marketing 
campaigns and activities and manufacturer’s subsidy are all effective. The two sets of 
estimates on the own price coefficient are almost identical.  
<Insert Table 4 about here> 
                                                 
19 China Statistics Press (2005, 2006), Provincial Statistical Yearbooks. 
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Table 5 provides the regional estimates. Note that dealers in Beijing, the East, and 
the South – the three most developed regions in the country – have significantly larger 
coefficient estimates on price, i.e. higher price sensitivity, than those of the five less 
developed regions. The more competitiveness in these regions is also evident from the 
significant, positive, and large estimates of peer-effect in these three regions. National-
level advertising and public relations campaigns and regional-level marketing are 
effective in generating demand. Finally, the marketing resources Computec spends on 
individual dealers seem to be effective in four out of the eight regions.  
<Insert Table 5 about here> 
Table 6 shows the estimated average final prices by region. According to company 
officials, these estimates seem to be a little (approximately 5-10%) higher than their 
expectation based on anecdotal evidence on the average purchased prices obtained from 
the second-tier retail shops. For example, such purchased prices in Beijing were around 
Y$1400-1500, which is only slightly lower than my estimates of Y$1512. This makes 
sense since my final dealer price estimates should be taken as the average of the 
wholesale price to second-tier retail shops and retail prices to end-consumers.  
<Insert Table 6 about here> 
Based on my estimates of the final prices and individual quantities at each dealer, 
I use equations (8) to calculate the economic rent earned by each dealer in the fiscal year 
2004-2005. The first two columns in Table 7 show the estimated gross rent, before 
accounting for the entrepreneur’s opportunity costs, employee wages, and office/store 
rental charges while the last two columns summarize these results by region. My results 
show that the average net economic rent of a typical dealer is Y$4.48 million, or 
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approximately $30,000, for the one-year data period, which shows the effectiveness of 
the profit-generating purpose of the two-stage ordering process. Since Computec does not 
use any transfer mechanism to extract such profits from the dealers, ex ante rent equals ex 
post rent20. The existence of ex ante rent is circumstantially supported by the observation 
that there is always a “queue” of potential dealers hoping to land a dealership from 
Computec (e.g., Mathewson and Winter 1985, Kaufmann and Lafontaine 1994). 
<Insert Table 7 about here> 
 
3.6. An Assessment of the Effectiveness of the Two-Stage Ordering Mechanism 
Computec’s two-stage ordering process creates economic incentives for its 
independent dealers. Anecdotal evidence from both internal and external sources 
provides support to the effectiveness of this arrangement. Interviews with company 
officials revealed that before the deployment of the current two-stage ordering process, 
dealers’ markups were much thinner than what I estimated. I further compare the 
profitability of Computec’s dealers to that of other information-technology (IT) 
distributors in China. By Tables 1 and 4, the net profit margin of an average Computec is 
6.52%. I use the two largest IT distributors in China – Digital China and PCI – as 
benchmarks. According to their company reports, the operating margins, i.e. profit 
margins before interest and taxes but excluding opportunity cost of entrepreneur labor, 
are 1.89% (fiscal year 2005-6) and 1.35% (first 3 quarters of 2006) for Digital China and 
                                                 
20 Ex post rent is the stream of positive profits earned by dealers after they commence marketing the 
product while ex ante rent are the economic profit earned by dealers before they commence marketing.  For 
example, a two-part tariff where the manufacturer extracts all the profits through a fixed fee involves ex 
post rent rather than ex ante rent.  
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In this chapter, I match the decision structure and results of the model with actual 
contractual arrangements and novel data obtained from Computec to estimate the 
unobserved final prices and hence the economic profit earned by each dealer over a one-
year period. I find that the manufacturer leaves rent with a heterogeneous group of 
dealers. Complementing what have found in the franchising context (Kaufmann and 
Lafontaine 1994; Michael and Moore 1995), this is a new evidence showing the existence 
of downstream rent in a non-franchising and non-exclusive distribution arrangement.  
By  embedding observable data into the specific institutional context is important 
for model-building and subsequent interpretation of data (Coughlan and Wernerfelt 1989). 
Manufacturers often offer quantity discounts and induce downstream dealers to preorder. 
Using the analytical results from Chapter 2, I show that under the two-stage ordering 
process adopted by Computec, an observed positive discount could result in Cournot 
outcomes rather than Bertrand outcomes in the downstream market even though its 
dealers compete in price; hence, quantity rather than price would be the appropriate 
choice variable in formulating the supply relation in both theory and empirical analyses. 
Without taking account of the details of the ordering process, a researcher would not 
know whether to summarize industry supply as the result of price or quantity competition.  
                                                 
21 See www.digiticalchina.com.hk and www.ecs.com.sg. Assessed on December 5, 2007. ECS Singapore is 
a major shareholder of PCI China. The companies use the accounting term “operating margin” or 
“operating profit” in their financial statements.  
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My findings also have important managerial implications. First, in many contexts, 
downstream rent-generating mechanisms like resale price maintenance, territorial 
restrictions, and fixed fee transfers might not be feasible. By showing the existence of 
downstream rent in Computec’s distribution channel, I showed that a combination of the 
two-stage ordering process with its quantity discounts is an effective mechanism to soften 
downstream competition and thus to leave economic rent. In this sense, my study 
identified an alternative mechanism in widespread use which creates economic profits 
downstream. Second, in many contexts (e.g., business-to-business sales), downstream 
members might be reluctant to reveal their pricing information because of strategic 
considerations (for instance revealing one’s profit margin is likely to weaken one’s 
bargaining position in vertical relationships). My estimation method should help 
manufacturers recover the unobserved downstream selling prices. My method requires 
information on contractual arrangements, wholesale prices, quantities, and number of 
assigned dealers; such information is likely to be readily available in company records. 
Therefore, my model should appeal to those manufacturers which want to adopt a more 
structural way to alleviate the asymmetric information problem. 
According to the self-enforcement theory, economic rent, combined with 
supervision, is a useful instrument to induce downstream marketing effort. In the next 
chapter, using the estimated amounts of dealer profits and other data, I look at the 
interdependence of rent and supervision and its role in encouraging the provision of 










In long-term relationships between a manufacturer and its dealers, the upstream 
firm often uses both economic incentives and supervision as control mechanisms to 
coordinate downstream marketing activities (e.g., Weitz and Jap 1995). The logic, 
according to the self-enforcing contracts literature (e.g., Dutta, Bergen, and John 1994; 
Heide 1994; Kaufmann and Lafontaine 1994; Klein and Murphy 1988, 1997; Lafontaine 
and Raynaud 2002; Murry and Heide 1998; Telser 1980; Wathne and Heide 2000) is that 
that, when monitoring is costly, combining  economic rent for the dealers with the 
manufacturer’s supervisory effort can serve as an incentive that discourages shirking and 
encourages non-contractible promotional activities by dealers. 
Both theory and empirical work find economic incentives co-exist with 
supervision in bilateral agreements. The self-enforcement perspective offers a framework 
to analyze the nature of such vertical agreements. In that framework, economic rent, 
supervision, and the authority to terminate are the three required elements to make a 
vertical agreement self-enforcing within a dyad (e.g., Kaufmann and Lafontaine 1994; 
Klein and Murphy 1988, 1997; Klein 1999). Given the right to terminate non-performing 
dealers, downstream economic rent in the form of a profit stream provided  by the 
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manufacturer combined with supervision in the form of directing dealer behavior and 
monitoring their performance incentivize dealers to provide desired promotional services. 
The self-enforcement framework (e.g., Klein 1980, p.360), together with classical 
efficiency wage theory (e.g., Becker and Stigler 1974; Shapiro and Stiglitz 1984) and 
some recent work on the theory of the firm (e.g., Roberts 2004, p.35), presumes that 
manufacturer’s supervision and economic rents act as substitutes in their ability to reduce 
opportunism22 in relational exchanges. The rationale is that the more capable the 
manufacturer is in observing dealers’ compliance through supervision, the less the 
marginal value of profit premium to enforce desired behavior. This implies that to induce 
a desired level of compliance, the manufacturer can trade off between the amount of 
downstream rent and its supervisory intensity.  
However, the exact nature of their interdependence, i.e. whether the amount of 
economic rent left downstream and the intensity of manufacturer’s supervision are 
substitute or complementary control instruments, has not been empirically established. In 
fact, institutional details about Computec’s relationship with its dealers suggest that the 
intensities of supervision and downstream rent are used as complementary, rather than 
substitute, control instruments. As I showed in previous chapters, the manufacturer 
mainly uses a two-stage ordering process to leave rent. At the same time, Computec’s 
sales and marketing personnel supervises its dealers by directing and monitoring their 
activities. According to field interviews, regional managers at Computec revealed that 
their supervisory effort often received with the most cooperative behavior, and thus led to 
                                                 
22 Notwithstanding, recent analytical models (e.g., Allugin and Ellingsen 2002) and empirical work (e.g., 
Rebitzer 1995) show the substitutability prediction between supervision and wage premium can be tedious. 
See also Prendergast (1999). 
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most productive results, from the dealers who were highly profitable. This observation 
implies that supervision and rent are complements. 
Given the presumably important role of economic rent and supervision in vertical 
agreements, it is surprising that there is very little empirical work on their 
interdependence and its performance or outcome effects. The purpose of this chapter is to 
empirically assess whether evidence in Computec’s context supports the field observation 
that rent and supervision are complements and, if so, the effect of such complementarity 
on inducing non-contractible dealer marketing efforts. Complementarity carries a precise 
meaning in this dissertation: two instruments are said to be complements (substitutes) if 
increasing usage of one increases (lowers) the returns of using the other (Milgrom and 
Roberts 1990; 1995)23. According to this definition, merely observing the joint-adoption 
or co-existence of the two instruments is necessary but not sufficient to conclude that 
they are complements (e.g., Wathne and Heide 2000).  
Fit among governance forms is essential to achieve efficient outcomes in bilateral 
relationships (e.g., Ghosh and John 1999, 2005). Complementarity is a useful idea to 
analyze such organizational design issues since it offers a concrete concept to study 
synergistic effects and provides some basis to interpret the effects of fit among marketing 
strategies, organization structures, or managerial processes (Milgrom and Roberts 1995). 
By studying complementarity between rent and supervision, this essay makes three 
primary contributions to the research of vertical agreements. First, in many organizational 
design contexts, multiple practices are adopted in a complementary manner to create 
synergistic effects on intended outcomes. Therefore, investigating complementarity 
among various control mechanisms has important implications to the study of governance 
                                                 
23 See next section on the technical definition and operationalization of complementarity.  
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issues since an incoherent system would lead to inefficiency (e.g., Athey and Stern 2002; 
Ghosh and John 2005). This essay responds to this call by demonstrating, in the context 
of self-enforcing vertical agreements, the existence of complementarity between 
downstream rent and supervision and its effect on the supply of dealer marketing effort.  
Second, my empirical analysis below confirms the field observation that rent and 
supervision are complements. In other words, in Computec’s case, expending more 
supervisory effort increases the returns to leaving a profit premium when it comes to 
inducing the provision of downstream promotional effort. This evidence is contrary to the 
presumptions from classical efficiency-wage and self-enforcement theories; thus, the 
intensity of rent and supervision need not to be negatively related as per conventional 
wisdom. My results also suggest that the amount of economic rent and/or supervisory 
effort affects the intensity, and not just the existence, or not, of downstream marketing 
effort. These new findings call for extensions of the aforementioned theoretical 
frameworks (e.g., Allgulin and Ellingsen 2002).  
Third, in the process of exploring the complementarity issue, I introduce recently 
developed methods in the organizational design literature to the testing of 
complementarity in the context of distribution channels. While reduced forms test 
statistical associations to determine complementarity (e.g., Arora and Gambardella 1990; 
Novak and Stern 2007), the more structural productivity (or outcome) approach posits 
that desired outcomes are a function of control instruments (e.g., Athey and Stern 2003). 
These methods are appealing since price or cost information on the use of control 
instruments is not required. Note that although market prices are readily available for 
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many consumer products, prices of institutional choices would be very difficult to 
measure or observe.  
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 defines complementarity. Section 
4.3 reviews the literature on self-enforcing agreements. Institutional arrangements are 
described in Section 4.4. Sections 4.5 and 4.6 describe data and empirical methods, 
respectively. Section 4.7 presents empirical findings. Section 4.8 concludes.  
 
4.2. Complementarity: A Definition 
In the organizational design literature, the notion of complementarity is directly 
related to supermodular functions in lattice theory. Specifically, function f: R2  R is 
supermodular if for all a, b in the 2-dimenational x-y space  
(9)    f(max(a, b)) – f(a) ≥ f(a) – f(min(a, b)),  
where max(a, b) is the coordinate-wise maximum of a and b, i.e. (max(x1, y1), max(x2, y2)) 
and min(a, b) is the coordinate-wise minimum, i.e. (min(x1, y1), min(x2, y2)). In (9) the 
two activities x and y are said to be complements24. Moreover, f is submodular and its 
arguments are substitutes if function (–f) is supermodular; or, the inequality sign in (9) 
becomes “<”. Thus x and y are complements (substitutes) if increasing one variable raises 
(reduces) the return of using the other, or if increasing both x and y together yields a 
higher (lower) return than the sum of just increasing x or y separately25.  
It can be shown that for a twice-differentiable function f, its arguments x and y are 
complementary if and only if the second-order cross derivative between x and y, ∂2f / 
                                                 
24 Following the literature on organizational design, I use weak inequality in (9) to define supermodality 
and thus when equality holds for (9), x and y are (weakly) complements as well.  See also Milgrom and 
Roberts (1990; 1995) for a definition of supermodular functions with Rn  R. 
25 Notice that (9) can be rewritten as f(max(a, b)) – f(min(a, b)) ≥ [f(a) – f (min(a, b))] + [f(b) – f(min(a, 
b))]. 
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∂x∂y ≡ fxy ≥ 0 (Topkis 1994). This expression is identical to the definition of 
interdependence in productivity analysis (Beattie and Taylor 1985; Coelli, Rao, and 
Battese 1998). In productivity analysis, x and y are said to be complementary (substitutes) 
if the cross derivative is positive (negative)26, 27. Therefore, one way to empirically infer 
whether the two instruments are complements is to look at the sign of the interaction term 
between x and y in a regression where the dependent variable is productivity or desired 
outcome. Notice that this operationalization of complementarity does not require the 
knowledge of the cost of adopting a control instrument. This is appealing since in many 
contexts of organizational design, it would be difficult to obtain information on the cost 
of various institutional choices.   
 
4.3. Control Mechanisms in Self-Enforcing Agreements  
Marketing researchers have long pointed out the importance of channel control 
(e.g., Bucklin 1973). A control system is defined as the set of procedures adopted by an 
upstream firm for the purpose of monitoring, directing, evaluating, and compensating its 
agents (Anderson and Oliver 1987). This notion of control, which includes information 
provision and gathering on the one hand, and reinforcement through incentives on the 
other, is very similar to the ideas developed in the self-enforcement framework. Among 
                                                 
26 This is also known as Edgeworth complements (Milgrom and Roberts 1995). In the economics of 
production literature, this relationship is called factor interdependence which is a different concept from 
factor substitutability. The latter assumes constant output while the former does not. See Beattie and Taylor 
(1985, p.34). This chapter follows other organizational design studies by focusing on the interdependence, 
rather than the substitutability, between institutional choices.   
27 Separately, the marketing literature has almost exclusively used cross-price effects on consumer goods to 
examine consumption complementarity (e.g., Chintagunta and Halder 1998; Duvvuri, Ansari, and Gupta 
2008; Manchanda, Ansari, and Gupta 1999; Song and Chintagunta 2007). These studies test 
complementarity between consumer products by estimating cross price effects on quantity demanded. If the 
quantity demanded for product y is increasing in the price of x, i.e. ∂y/∂px ≥ 0 (<0), then x and y are said to 
be complements (substitutes). 
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various theoretical perspectives28, the institutional details of Computec’s distribution 
arrangements are best aligned to this framework. As a result, for the remainder of this 
section, I will discuss the theory and its main elements in detail.  
Self-enforcing agreements in vertical settings refer to manufacturer-dealer 
agreements that are enforced within the dyad without any intervention of third parties. 
These agreements are self-enforceable because dealers get a benefit from the vertical 
relationship that is at risk if they do not behave or perform as requested by the 
manufacturer (Lafontaine and Raynaud 2002). To promote its product, the manufacturer 
often request dealers to engage in marketing services and promotional efforts such as 
presale education, product display, quality assurance, and customer recruitment. However, 
these marketing services can be costly for dealers to perform and competing dealers can 
free ride (Telser 1960; Blair and Lafontaine 2005). In addition, from the manufacturer’s 
perspective, dealer effort level might be too low in many contexts. This is because the 
gross profit margin is usually much smaller downstream than upstream and the bulk of 
benefits of selling an additional unit do not go to the dealers (Blair and Kaserman 1983; 
Klein 1999; Klein and Murphy 1997) 29. Together, these vertical externalities can result in 
sub-optimal dealer effort.  
                                                 
28 Alternative theories would be property rights theory, agency theory, and transaction cost analysis. 
However, because (1) there is no ownership decision to be made on specific physical investments between 
Computec and its dealers, (2) uncertainty and risk sharing do not seem to be important factors in their 
relationship, and (3) neither side makes noticeable specific investments, these theories would be less 
applicable in my context. Notice that the original self-enforcement theory (Klein and Leffler 1981, Klein 
and Murphy 1988) is based on the notion of choosing the optimal self-enforcing range by balancing 
flexibility to adapt and possible hold-up ex post. Nevertheless, hold-up due to specific investments is not 
necessary for self-enforcement arguments to be applicable. Minimizing bargaining cost ex post (Barzel 
1982; Masten 2007) or the mere existence of ex post rent (Klein 1995) can lead to hold-ups.  
29 Manufacturers usually incur large fixed costs and therefore need to have a large gross margin in 
equilibrium to recover those investments in, for example, R&D and branding. 
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When dealer inputs are easy to measure or outputs are good indicators of 
marketing effort, the manufacturer can compensate the dealers through trade deals such 
as sales drives, display allowances, and off-invoices (Blattberg and Neslin 1990; 
Coughlan, Anderson, Stern, and El-Ansary 2006). However, marketing efforts and their 
outcomes can be difficult to measure and verify due to uncertainty, complexity, and a 
lack of perfect monitoring; hence direct compensation through high-power incentives 
may not be infeasible (e.g. Celly and Frazier 1996; Raynaud and Lafontaine 2002; Klein 
and Murphy 1988, p.285; Wathne and Heide 2000, 2004). Moreover, even when the 
dealers have the best intention and faith to sell, they may not have the necessary product 
knowledge or marketing skills to make the best use of their effort. To induce desired yet 
non-contractible dealer services under these circumstances, the manufacturer needs to 
both generate “benefits” in the form of a downstream profit stream and supervise its 
dealers. Finally, to constrain downstream opportunism and discipline non-performing 
dealers, the manufacturer ought to reserve termination rights. Evidence has shown that 
these rights economize enforcement costs in vertical contracts (Brickley, Dark, and 
Weisbach 1991; Klick, Kobayashi, and Ribstein 2008). 
Economic Rent 
Economic rent refers to the part of dealer revenue that is above economic costs, 
including opportunity costs of the dealership. As I have argued, when marketing efforts 
are non-contractible, high-power incentives that tie to specific actions or outcomes are 
not available and thus economic rent becomes an appropriate incentive instrument. It is 
important to note that using economic rent as an incentive mechanism, and thus a self-
enforcement framework, applies most appropriately when desired dealer actions are 
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difficult to verify and directly contract for (Cheung 2001; Rebitzer 1995). Economic rent 
can be created through restrictive distribution arrangements such as resale price 
maintenance (e.g. Klein and Murphy 1988; Telser 1960), exclusive territories (e.g. Dutta, 
Bergen, and John 1994; Dutta, Heide, and Bergen 1999), or upfront fixed fees (e.g., 
Kaufmann and Lafontaine 1994) and as I showed in previous chapters, ordering 
processes. Using economic rent as a control instrument achieves two functions. First, the 
manufacturer compensates desired yet non-contractible dealer services (Telser 1960; 
Marvel 1982). Second and foremost, economic rent acts an enforcement mechanism for 
dealers to adhere to, rather than to violate, requested behaviors (Klein 1996; Klein and 
Murphy 1988, 1997; Telser 1980). When the manufacturer leaves a large enough rent, the 
dealer would find its gain from performing as requested is larger than the expected gain 
from non-performing, and thus will choose to behave as desired by the manufacturer.  
Formally30, the dealer compares the expected gain from compliance, Bc, and the 
additional short-run gain from deviating from requested behavior, Bd, and then decides 
whether to supply the desired level of marketing effort. Bd can be expressed as 
(10)     )m()m(B HtLtd π−π= , 
where t is the amount of time it takes the manufacturer to detect non-compliance. πt(mH) 
and πt(mL) are dealer profit under high marketing effort and low marketing effort 
respectively. Bc, on the other hand, is the present discounted value of the future profit 
stream, or economic rent, that can be earned in the dealership as long as the dealer is 
performing as desired by the manufacturer: 
                                                 
30 This discussion is adapted from Klein and Murphy (1997). Other papers have discussed this in a similar 











where r is the discount factor. This profit stream is lost if the dealer is found to have 
underprovided effort. Then in a self-enforcing agreement, the dealer will perform as 
requested if and only if dc BB ≥  at every point in time. 
Supervision 
While economic rent functions as reinforcement for desired behavior in a control 
system, the manufacturer also guides and instructs dealer’s activities (Alchian and 
Demsetz 197231; Blair and Lafontaine 2005; Lafontaine and Raynaud 2002; Klein and 
Murphy 1988). The supervisory effort helps to direct, as well as establish the extent of, 
dealer compliance and performance. In this dissertation, supervision connotes a broader 
meaning than monitoring. In the marketing literature, monitoring often refers to efforts 
that reduce information asymmetry through the measurement of output and behavior (e.g., 
Anderson and Oliver 1987; Heide 1994; Heide, Wathne, and Rokkan 2007). And the term 
supervision is further inclusive of efforts that correspond to active information provision 
and guidance (Alchian and Demesetz 1972). 
Monitoring has been widely studied as a control instrument in the marketing 
literature. Many have looked at intra-firm monitoring and its effect on individual 
employees32. For example, Joworski (1988) looks at the antecedents of adopting formal 
(input/process/output) versus informal (self/social/cultural) monitoring mechanisms and 
                                                 
31Specifically, Alchian and Demestz (1972, p.782) use the term monitor to “connote measuring output 
performance, appropriating rewards, observing the input behavior of inputs as means of detecting or 
estimating their marginal productivity and giving assignments and instructions as in what to do and how to 
do it”. I follow this definition but choose to use the term supervision in this dissertation.  
32 See Anderson and Oliver (1987) and Jorworski (1988) for reviews. See also Oliver and Anderson (1994) 
and Jaworski, Stathakopoulos, and Krishnan (1993).  
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their consequences on marketing personnel and their unit33. Anderson and Oliver (1987) 
distinguish between outcome-based and behavior-based monitoring and hypothesize their 
impacts on sales people’s performance. On the other hand, research on governance forms 
has examined inter-firm monitoring mechanisms. Stump and Heide (1996) look at the 
relationship among different control mechanisms and buyer monitoring of suppliers’ 
outputs is one of them. Lafontaine and Slade (1996) and Heide et al (2007) examine the 
actual effects of output- versus behavior-monitoring on partner’s opportunistic behaviors. 
Bello and Gilliland (1998) investigate, among other coordinative mechanisms34, the 
determinants and effects of output and process monitoring on sales and profitability of 
export channels. In generally, monitoring, being one type of supervisory efforts, is found 
to safeguard against opportunistic behavior, especially when manufacturer’s monitoring 
activities are viewed as legitimate from the dealer’s perspective (e.g., Heide et al 2007). 
Complementarity between Economic Rent and Supervision 
Based on self-enforcement arguments, Murry and Heide (1998) look at the impact 
of incentive premium and supervision on dealer’s compliance to promotion agreements35 
and find that stores’ compliance to promotion agreements is increasing in incentive 
premiums but not affected by monitoring; unfortunately, their paper does not explore if 
complementarity exists between the two. In fact, neither explicit discussion nor empirical 
                                                 
33 Interestingly, the author also raises the issue of synergy and complementarity between different control 
mechanisms; but they do not offer a formal test. 
34 Flexibility is the third coordinative mechanism in their theoretical framework. See also Celly and Frazier 
(1996) which investigate the antecedents of using outcome-based and behavior-based communication 
strategies by supplier personnel to their distributors.  
35 Interpersonal attachment between boundary personnel is also included in their model as another 
determinants of compliance.  
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testing of the complementarity issue is common in the self-enforcement literature36, in 
spite of the frequently mentioned co-existence of rent and supervision (e.g., Klein and 
Murphy 1988; Murry and Heide 1998). But as we saw, although co-existence is 
necessary, it is not sufficient to infer complementarity.  
As discussed earlier, assuming detection of cheating leads to termination, the 
dealer would rather supply the desired high-level marketing effort and not deviate if the 
additional gain from deviation is smaller than the expected value of the profit stream 
earned by performing; that is:  
(11)    cHtLtd B)m()m(B ≤π−π= . 
Now suppose that the manufacturer increases its per-period profit premium for 
supplying the high marketing effort to πt’(mH) ( > πt(mH)). Given that the short-run gain 
to the dealer from shirking, πt(mL), is unchanged, the incentive to deviate is lower as Bd is 
decreased. As a result, the manufacturer can reduce its supervisory effort, say from SH to 
SL, to detect non-compliance. I call the change from SL to SH the substitution effect on 
supervision. In this scenario, consistent with the assumption in classical efficiency wage 
models (e.g., Becker and Stigler 1972; Shapiro and Stiglitz 1984) economic rent and 
supervision are considered as substitute instruments.  
 However, being substitutes is not a necessary consequence of the increased rent. 
Instead of fixing the desired effort level, I allow it to be affected by the amount of 
downstream rent and thus the desired level can be varied continuously above mL. 
Specifically, at the same time of offering more profit premium, it is reasonable to assume 
that the manufacturer would also like its dealers to raise their effort level to mH’ ( > mH). 
                                                 
36 Klein (1980) hints that the two instruments might be substitutes (p.360). In labor economics, there is a 
large body of theoretical and empirical work examining complementarity between wage premium and 
supervision. See Prendergast (1999) for review.  
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To ensure that the heightened effort level is implemented and thus the higher profit 
premium is justified, the manufacturer is likely to expend a higher supervision level than 
SL, say at SH’ on the dealers. I call the change from SL to SH’ the scale effect on 
supervision. Whether rent and supervision are substitutes or complements depends on the 
relative size of the substitution and scale effects. When the scale effect dominates (is 
dominated by) the substitution effect and renders SH’ larger (smaller) than SH, economic 
rent and supervision are complementary (substitute) in inducing dealer efforts37.  
This analysis shows that it would be difficult to sign the interdependence of 
economic rent and supervision a priori. Hence, I take the theoretic ambiguity to mean 
that whether rent and supervision are complements or substitutes is ultimately an 
empirical matter. Before delving into the empirical analysis, I next provide a brief 
description on Computec’s institutional arrangement, mainly on its supervision effort and 
dealers’ marketing activities that are desired by the manufacturer.  
 
4.4. Institutional Arrangement 
Computec has a network of 60 independent dealers throughout the country and 
has divided the country into eight geographic sales regions. Manufacturers in this 
industry in China are challenged by an under-developed infrastructure that inhibits 
distribution and marketing of their products to interior towns and peripheral cities where 
economic development is rapid. Table 8 presents economic indicators, viz. the income 
levels and economic growth rates across the eight sales regions. To capitalize on the rapid 
economic growth, manufacturers like Computec actively seek dealers that are stable 
financially and capable of undertaking desired market development activities. Moreover, 
                                                 
37 Recall that this relationship is called as factor interdependence. See footnote 26.  
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to maintain flexibility Computec uses a non-exclusive distribution system and dealership 
agreements can be terminated at will from both sides. Indeed, Computec has terminated 
non-performing dealers in the past. Besides selling, a dealer would be requested to 
organize and carry out local promotional activities, including product training, marketing 
materials delivery, and customer development38. Since these services (1) are difficult to 
verify by third parties and (2) may not link to immediate sales, Computec does not use 
formal agreements to enforce them. Instead, Computec uses both economic incentives 
and active supervision to induce dealer effort in market development.  
Computec believes that leaving dealers a satisfying amount of profits is essential 
to create incentives for them to sell, carry, and support its products39. To generate 
economic rent, the company adopts the effective two-stage ordering process I examined 
in previous chapters. Computec also offers subsidies, nominally known as marketing 
dollars, to selected accounts who are competent and devoted dealers located in strategic 
markets. These marketing expenses are intended for local advertisements, outdoor 
displays, or promotional events (see Section 3.3). But the manufacturer usually 
overcompensates – some times quite significantly – for these activities. According to 
company executives, this purposeful act is used to indirectly reward these key channel 
partners for their long-term performance and compliance. Unfortunately, there is no 
official record on the overcompensated portion and as a result I simply call these 
marketing dollars as a manufacturer’s subsidy. Note that all decisions related to the 
                                                 
38 Customer development activities aim to target those consumers or small retailers who are not familiar 
with the Computec product. These activities include holiday sales events, small-retailer conferences, and 
new-product launch campaigns. 
39 See also Kaufmann and Lafontaine (1994) on McDonald’s statements referring to its suppliers.  
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ordering process and marketing subsidies are controlled by Computec’s top executives 
and not by regional managers40.  
Regional managers are responsible for local sales, supervising dealers, and other 
operational tasks. Supervisory efforts include directing, instructing, supporting, and 
monitoring downstream activities. Specifically, the regional managers, working together 
with their staff, direct and monitor dealers’ sales efforts. They also help them to organize 
local sales events, trade shows, and dealer meetings. Recruiting new customers is another 
important joint effort. Through these interactions, Computec further gathers market 
intelligence on both intra- and inter- brand competition.  
Regional managers spend their supervisory effort in a discriminating fashion 
across regions and dealers. Field interviews reveal that dealers located in cities and areas 
with high income or fast economic growth receive the most attention and support. This is 
because of the huge market potential in remote and peripheral regions and hence it is 
critical to establish awareness and exploit market opportunities early on. Regional 
managers also prefer working with devoted dealers who are more likely to concentrate 
their effort in selling the Computec brand.41  
More important for the purpose of this chapter, regional managers revealed that 
their supervisory effort often received with the most cooperative behavior, and thus 
produced most desirable outcomes, from the dealers who were earning high profits. One 
reason is that more profitable dealers seem to be those who are competent as well. 
                                                 
40 Given the institutional facts on how the subsidy is structured, this variable may be a candidate instrument 
for dealer profit. See Sections 4.5 and 4.6. 
41 Computec compensates its regional managers through fixed salaries plus semi-annual bonuses. In 
addition to sales and market-share considerations, company executives look at dealers’ qualities and overall 
business sustainability in the corresponding region to decide on the exact amount of bonus. Performance 
review and assessment on these managers are subjective and have never been written into their employment 
contracts.  
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According to company officials, two additional reasons explain this. First, the dealer 
understands that the manufacturer’s supervisory activities benefit him in multiple ways42. 
Among other benefits, these include establishing reputation by tying to a nationally 
recognized brand, improving technical and marketing expertise through manufacturer’s 
training programs, and gaining valuable inputs in joint-promotional events. Second, non-
compliance is easier to detect upon close supervision. For the more profitable dealers, 
this implies a larger loss of future profit in the case of relationship termination. All these 
observations suggest that Computec’s supervisory effort would be expended 
complementarily with dealer profit to induce downstream marketing effort. Testing this 
hypothesis requires empirical analysis to which I now turn.    
 
4.5. Empirical Methods 
There is an increasing amount of work investigating complementarity in 
organizational design issues such as human resources management (e.g., Ichniowski, 
Shaw, and Prennushi 1997), decision-rights allocation (Arrunada, Garicano, and Vazquez 
2001), contract provisions in franchising (e.g., Brickley 1999; Lafontaine 1992), research 
and design (e.g., Arora and Gambardella 1990; Cassiman and Veugelers 2005; Cockburn, 
Henderson, and Stern 2002; Nesta and Saviotti 2005; Sakakibara 2001), procurement 
management (Mayer, Nickerson, and Owan 2004), product development (Stern and 
Novak 2007), and adoption of information technology (Athey and Stern 2002). To test 
the complementarity between the intensities of downstream economic rent and 
                                                 
42 This does not preclude the existence of undesired characteristics such as a sense of loss of autonomy 
caused by supervision from the dealer’s perspective. Therefore, there are limits to what and how much the 
regional managers may get involved with the dealer’s operations. For example, without a dealer’s explicit 
permission, Computec is not allowed to audit a dealer’s accounting records.  
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supervision in encouraging dealers to supply of marketing effort, I employ the empirical 
methods along the lines of those used in recent studies on complementarity in 
organizational design. Since this literature is not widely cited in marketing, I provide 
some background information. In this section, I review three approaches that have been 
used in the organizational design literature as follows.  
Adoption Approach 
Arora and Gambardella (1990) formulate a reduced form method which is 
sometimes called the “adoption approach”43 and find internal and external alliances are 
complementary in biotechnological innovations. Cassiman and Veugelers (2006) apply 
this method to study the make-or-buy decisions of R&D strategies. In the franchising 
literature, Brickley (1999) looks at complementarity among provisions in franchise 
contracts and Lafontaine (1992) explores interdependence between franchise fees and 
royalty rates in the same way. The advantage of using the adoption approach is its ease of 
implementation. Moreover, it is very attractive in those contexts in which outcome or 
productivity measures are not readily available. Arora and Gambardella show that if two 
instruments x and y are complements, i.e. fxy ≥ 0, and each practice is (weakly) 
decreasing in return, i.e. fxx ≤ 0 and fyy ≤ 0, then the covariance between any two 
instruments, say x and y, conditional upon firm characteristics θ is non-negative: 
(12)     0θ))]|E(y(yθ))|E(xE[(x ≥−⋅− . 
Implementing the adoption approach in the context of Computec is quite simple. 
First, the adoption variables – in my case, rent and supervision – are linearly and 
independently regressed on dealer characteristics, Xi: 
                                                 
43 See also Arora (1996).  
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Then complementarity is inferred from the correlation between the residuals obtained 
from these regressions. Specifically, Arora and Gambardella (1990) show that a non-
negative pair-wise correlation between the OLS residuals, i.e. Cov )ˆ,ˆ( i2i1 μμ  ≥ 0, would 
suggest complementarity between xi and yi.  
The estimation method specified in (13) assumes that the manufacturer chooses 
the optimal intensities of downstream rent and supervision effort at the individual dealer 
level. It also assumes that E(μ1•μ2| Xi) is a diagonal matrix, i.e. shocks to xi and yi are not 
correlated after controlling for observed dealer characteristics. For the Computec data, I 
start off by using this reduced form model. Note that non-negative correlation between 
the residuals, according to Arora and Gambardella’s derivation of (12), is only necessary 
for but sufficient for complementarity. Moreover, unobserved dealer heterogeneity that 
affects Computec’s optimal choice of supervision intensity can lead to omitted-variable 
bias in the supervision regression (Athey and Stern 2003; Cassiman and Veugelers 2006). 
Therefore, a non-negative correlation is only suggestive, but not conclusive, evidence for 
complementarity.  
Adoption Approach – Instrumental Variables 
 One implication from supermodular functions is that x and y are positively 
correlated if they are interdependent and thus regressing one activity on another activity 
can help to detect complementarity. In order to reduce biases caused by unobserved 
heterogeneity and sample selection, instrumental variables or exclusion restrictions can 
be used. Novak and Stern (2007) adopts the instrumental variable approach to study 
vertical integration decisions in automobile systems while Miravete and Pernias (2006) 
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structurally derive exclusion restrictions to investigate the relationship between 
production and process innovations in the Spanish ceramics industry. For the Computec 
data, I regress supervision intensity on dealer’s profit, controlling for observable dealer 
characteristics: 
errorXxy i2i1i +γ+γ= . 
where, xi and yi are dealer profit and supervision respectively. Having supervision as the 
dependent variable assumes that the regional manager choose his optimal level of 
supervising effort on the basis of how much profit the dealer is making and other dealer 
characteristics. This is reasonable since the amount of downstream economic rent is 
fundamentally determined by three factors that are outside the control of the regional 
manager: (1) Computec’s net wholesale prices and sales volume, (2) whether to extract 
these rents – both decisions are made by Computec’s top executive, and (3) 
entrepreneurship and management skills of the dealership owner/executives.  
Nevertheless, profit would be endogenous for two reasons. Recall that 
calculations of downstream profit are based on estimated prices, together with other cost 
assumptions. There might be measurement errors in these. In addition, the manufacturer’s 
supervisory effort could also affect dealer’s profit. These endogeneities caused by both 
potential simultaneity and measurement errors should be taken care of. I use dealer’s 
monthly office rent and the manufacturer’s subsidy as instruments for dealer profit. 
Office rent affects dealer cost but should have no effect on supervision, so this would be 
a valid instrument. Moreover, as I discussed in Sections 3.3 and 4.4, manufacturer’s 
subsidy is used to create additional profit to loyal and/or key dealers by 
overcompensating their marketing activities and hence, seems to be another instrument 
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candidate for dealer profit. Indeed, overidentification tests confirm the validity of both 
instruments. 
Outcome Approach 
When productivity or outcome data is available, one can specify an 
organizational–design production function to study the effect of organizational choice on 
outcomes (Athey and Stern 2003). The outcome approach can be thought of an 
application of production economics analysis (e.g, Beattie and Taylor 1985; Coelli et al 
1998). Cassiman and Veugelers (2006), Nesta and Saviotti (2005), and Sakakibara (2001) 
are recent studies that adopt the outcome approach to investigate the impact of innovation 
practices on R&D outcomes.  
According to the self-enforcement framework, the purpose of leaving rent and 
supervision is to induce non-contractible yet desired market development effort 
downstream. This is exactly what Computec hopes to achieve in its channel management 
system. As a result, I assume that dealer i’s promotional effort, Pi, is a function of the 
amount of economic rent he earned (xi) and the supervision effort Computec expended on 
the dealership(yi). Specifically, I use a quadratic functional form to allow maximum 
flexibility:  




i2i1i1i ++⋅++++= , 
where Pi, is the desired outcome. Notice that the quadratic functional form can be thought 
as a second-order local approximation or Taylor expansion of any functional form 
(Beattie and Taylor 1985; Coelli et al 1998).  
In this specification, profit could still be endogenous since idiosyncratic factors 
such as entrepreneurship that would affect dealer effort might correlate with dealer profit. 
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Moreover, measurement error is a concern for dealer profit. Therefore, I estimate (14) by 
instrumenting profit, specifically the three terms involving profit – )y(x and , x, x ii
2
ii ⋅ , to 
remove potential biases caused by unobserved dealer heterogeneity and measurement 
errors. The instrumental variables I use are office rent, subsidy, their squared terms, and 
their interaction terms with supervision. Supervision is assumed to be exogenous to the 
dealer in my first set of estimations. 
 Would supervision be endogenous as well? There are two commons reasons that 
would make all the adoption variables endogenous. First, when adoption variables are 
discrete in cross-section inter-firm data, they are susceptible to sample selection bias 
(Athey and Stern 2003; Cassiman and Veugelers 2006): the econometrician only 
observes the selected part of the “full” data. But the nature of my context and data would 
have little concern for sample selectivity since I have the population of Computec’s 
dealers in my data and further, supervision is measured as a continuous variable.  
The second reason that supervision might be endogenous is unobserved 
heterogeneity. In cross-sectional organizational studies that have used the outcome 
approach, adoption decisions and their outcomes reside in the same firm, which makes 
the former likely to be correlated with the error term. In contrast, in my case the decisions 
on downstream marketing effort and manufacturer’s supervision intensity are made by 
two different entities. The dealer chooses its promotional effort (partly) based on the 
regional manager’s supervisory effort, which in turn is largely influenced by internal 
management guidelines and employment incentives. This should allay the issue of 
unobserved heterogeneity of this type.  
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Still, in making his decision on supervisory effort, the regional manager would 
take into account, in addition to observed dealer characteristics, some unobserved ones 
that affect dealer effort at the same time. In that case, I need to instrument both profit and 
supervision. To instrument supervision, I use the commonly-used variable “distance from 
headquarters” and test complementarity by assuming both variables are endogenous. 
Lastly, potential multicollinearity might make the effects of the linear and 
quadratic terms difficult to separate from that from the interaction term in (14) and thus 
the complementarity result would be sensitive to specifications. Marketing researchers, 
for instance Aiken and West (1991) and Jaccard, Turrisi, and Wan (1991), have 
suggested to mean-center all the terms involving the two variables in the interaction term 
to alleviate the multicollinearity concern44. Following this tradition, I mean-center 
supervision, profit, their quadratic terms, and the interaction term to produce a robust 
check on my previous results obtained from the outcome approach.  
 
4.6. Data 
 The data used for testing complementarity cover 59 dealers45. In addition to the 
transactional data that were used in Chapter 3, I used data from a survey that was 
administered to regional managers. Each regional manager, together with his staff, serves 
and supervises several dealers operating in the region. The questionnaire was developed 
after intensive interviews of the national sales director and two regional managers. These 
interviews provided background information on the industry, business practices, and 
                                                 
44 Nonetheless, this method may not be effective to reduce multicollinearity. Echambadi and Hess (2007) 
prove that mean-centering alters the interpretation of related coefficients but does not change the precisions 
of estimates.  
45 Computec has a total of 60 dealers, but one dealer’s information is not complete for the purpose of this 
chapter.  
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distributional and contractual arrangements. The questionnaire includes questions on 
dealer characteristics such as revenue in the past year, tenure of the dealership, number of 
competing brands carried, and cost information like rental charges. A regional manager 
also estimated the average number of working hours per month he worked with a specific 
dealer on various marketing activities. This measures Computec’s supervision intensity. 
Dealer effort is measured by the average number of working hours per month a dealer 
spent on various market development activities on the Computec product. Regional 
managers provided these estimates for those dealers under their corresponding 
jurisdictions. These estimates are presumed to be reliable since the regional managers had 
worked very closely with their dealers. The data collected from the surveys are assumed 
to be constant for the 12-month period. Supplementing the survey data, I collected 2004-
5 city-level economic data from China Provincial Statistics Yearbooks (published by 
National Statistics Bureau), viz. GDP per capita, and growth rates of GDP, 
telecommunication volume, and car ownership (see also Table 8). Table 9 describes the 
variables. Table 10 summarizes their pairwise correlations and descriptive statistics.  
 
4.7. Empirical Results 
 In this section, I present the empirical results on the interdependence of 
downstream economic rent and manufacturer’s supervision and its effect on dealer 
marketing effort. Empirical evidence from Computec’s data strongly supports my field 
interviews that these two control instruments are used in a complementary manner in 
inducing dealer marketing efforts. These results are robust across the three estimation 
approaches.  
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 Table 11 presents the results of the adoption approach. In column 1, as we would 
expect, dealer profit is strongly associated with the dealer size and manufacturer subsidy. 
Large dealers benefit from economies of scale and manufacturer’s subsidy money 
increases dealer’s profitability. The supervision regression in column 2 shows that a 
regional manager’s choice of supervisory effort is largely associated with the economic 
environment in which his dealer operates. The installed base of computers is larger in 
more developed cities and dealers located there maintain a higher level of Computec-
specific marketing activities. In turn, their corresponding regional managers supervise 
more. High growth regions also attract more attention from the regional managers. Notice 
that even after controlling for economic growth, Computec invests heavily in its effort on 
those dealers who are farther away from its headquarters, although the effect of distance 
is increasing at a decreasing rate.  The last two results confirm the manufacturer’s claim 
that they value peripheral markets due to their strategic importance for future market-
share considerations. Most importantly, the correlation between the residuals from the 
two adoption regressions is a significant 0.31 (p < 0.02), suggesting complementarity 
between downstream economic rent and supervision.  
<insert Table 11 about here> 
  To reflect the internal decision structure that regional managers use to choose 
their supervisory effort on based on dealer profit, dealer characteristics, and regional 
economic environment, I specify an alternative adoption approach – the instrumental-
variable adoption method – by letting supervision be the dependent variable. I also tried 
specifications that controlled for manufacturer’s subsidy, but the effect on supervision 
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was insignificant46. Hence only results that exclude subsidy as a regressand are reported 
in Table 12. As expected, dealer profit has a significant and positive effect on supervision 
in the OLS regression. In the two IV regressions, the effect of profit in 2SLS is not 
significant but becomes significant again in the GMM specification. The results on the IV 
regressions are not surprising: GMM has the advantage of being more efficient than 
2SLS (Cameron and Trivedi 2005; Hayashi 2000). The p-value of the Sargent statistic in 
2SLS is only marginally insignificant (p=0.11) which implies the instrumental variables 
might be correlated with the residuals in this specification. For these reasons, I focus my 
discussions on the OLS and GMM results.   
Again, the evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that Computec’s supervision 
intensity is complementary to economic rent left downstream. It is also worth pointing 
out that supervision is increasing in local income and local growth, as well as in the 
peripheral areas in the country. However, supervision is not significantly associated with 
dealer size, tenure, and number of competing brands carried, although the coefficients are 
directionally reasonable.  
Together, these results are very similar to those obtained by the original adoption 
method: they all suggest that the manufacturer’s supervisory effort is increasing in dealer 
profit on the one hand and driven by local economic environment on the other. 
<insert Table 12 about here> 
 To directly investigate the nature of the interdependence between downstream 
rent and supervision and its effect non-contractible dealer marketing effort, I turn to the 
outcome approach. Column 1 in Table 13 shows the OLS result, while in Columns 2 and 
                                                 
46 This implies that profit might mediate the relationship between subsidy and supervision and subsidy 
would be a valid instrument for profit (Baron and Kenny 1986). 
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3 profit and its associated terms, viz. (profit)2 and (profit*supervision) are assumed to be 
endogenous. Results across the three regressions are qualitatively similar. Nevertheless, 
the Hausman’s tests reject the null hypothesis that they are the same and hence I discuss 
the results mainly based on 2SLS and GMM methods.  
First and foremost, the coefficient of the interaction term (profit*supervision) in 
the IV regressions are significant and positive, supporting the claim that these two 
instruments are complements in inducing the desired outcome – dealer marketing effort. 
Recall our discussion on the notion of supermodular functions in Section 4.2., sign of the 
coefficient of the interaction term can be regarded as a direct test on complementarity 
between downstream profit and supervision. Recall that the results obtained from the 
earlier two sets of reduced forms are consistent with this direct evidence.   
<insert Table 13 about here> 
Second, dealer marketing effort is strongly and positively increasing in the 
economic profit the dealer makes. This positive effect is decreasing, however, as shown 
by the negative estimate of the squared term of profit. On the other hand, neither 
supervision nor its squared term has significant effects. Showing positive first-order 
effect of profit but insignificant first-order effect of supervision on dealer compliance is 
similar to what Murry and Heide (1998) find. Note that the second-order effects satisfy 
the key assumptions that are used to derive the validity of the adoption approach, i.e., 
weakly decreasing in both variables (see Equation (12) in Section 4.5.). This increases 
confidence in the reduced form results shown in Table 11.  
Third, dealers located in fast emerging markets and with longer tenure spend 
more marketing effort in promoting Computec’s product, whereas larger dealers do less 
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Computec-specific effort. The latter result is reasonable since dealers who have larger 
total revenues are more likely to engage in volume-based wholesale business which 
focuses on pricing decisions and thus are less likely to spend effort in market 
development activities.  
The GMM specification in Column 4 of Table 13 assumes that both profit and 
supervision are endogenous. All the variables that are related to the two variables are 
instrumented in this specification. Possibly due to the large number of endogenous 
variables needed to be instrumented, the Anderson statistic is not significant, suggesting 
potential weak IVs. Indeed, looking at the standard errors in Column 4 reveal that they 
are all larger than the OLS ones in Column 1. But even so, the interaction term 
(profit*supervision) remains significantly positive, which indicates complementarity 
between the two variables. Overall results are directionally similar to those of the OLS 
specification as marked by the insignificant Hausman result.   
Finally, I mean-center the five terms involving profit and/or supervision and 
report the results in Table 14. There is no change in the signs and significances of all 
coefficients of the control variables. Furthermore, the signs and standard errors of all 
mean-centered variables on dealer effort across specifications are qualitatively similar to 
those in Table 1347. Most importantly, the point estimate and standard error for the 
coefficient of the interaction term (Profit*Supervision) are identical to the un-mean-
centered ones and thus the complementarity effect is robust to mean-centering.  
<insert Table 13 about here> 
                                                 
47 The interpretations of the linear and quadratic terms are no longer marginal effects and rates of change of 
marginal effects, respectively (Echambadi and Hess 2007). They are, however, of lesser concern in my 
context as I focus on the coefficient of the interaction term or complementarity. 
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As a summary, the Computec data strongly support the hypothesis that the 
manufacturer uses economic rent and supervision in a complementary manner to 
encourage dealers to expend their non-contractible market development effort. This result 
is robust under a variety of econometric specifications. To the best of my knowledge, this 
is the first empirical evidence that shows the exact nature of the interdependence of 




Manufacturers often use multiple control mechanisms to manage their 
downstream channel members. Self-enforcement theory has particularly focused on the 
role of economic rent and supervision in enforcing private agreements. Although the 
theory suggests their co-existence, it does not offer a clear prediction on their 
interdependence. As I showed, when desired effort level can be varied continuously, 
signing their interdependence a priori would be difficult since the net effect of scale and 
substitution effects is ambiguous.  
In this chapter, I adopted recently developed econometric methods that have used 
in the organizational design literature to explore the interdependence between 
downstream economic rent and supervision intensity. Evidence from the Computec data 
supports my hypothesis that these two control instruments are complementary. This 
finding confirms my qualitative field observations. Moreover, my analysis suggests that, 
instead of being discrete, desired dealer effort can be affected by the size of downstream 
economic rent and/or supervision intensity in a continuous fashion. These results call for 
extensions of self-enforcement and efficiency-wage theories.   
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The complementarity result supports the economic rationale that the more capable 
the manufacturer in directing and observing dealer compliance and performance, the 
higher the marginal value of using economic rent to incentivize dealer effort. This 
rationale is not only consistent with the measurement and disciplinary connotations of 
supervision (Heide et al 2007), but is also agreeable with the information provision and 
productivity enhancing aspects of supervisory efforts (Anderson and Oliver 1987). 
Furthermore, as noted Heide (1994), long-term vertical relationships are often open-
ended. Supervision within such a relationship would not like a discrete event, i.e. 
detection of non-compliance leading to immediate termination. This ongoing nature of 
supervision in non-spot-market-based governance suggests that supervision might be 
necessarily complementary with economic rent in self-enforcing agreements48.  
 Finally, my findings in this chapter have important managerial implications. 
Although self-enforcement and efficiency-wage arguments see downstream premium and 
supervision intensity are substitute control mechanisms, the evidence in this paper shows 
otherwise. This finding, nevertheless, is consistent with the practice that has been adopted 
by Computec, a leading manufacturer in its industry. Although this is a case study, the 
proven practice would imply that it would be more effective for managers not only to use 
incentive premiums and supervision together, but also to adjust them in a complementary 
manner to enforce compliance in long-term vertical relationships.   
                                                 





 Limitations and Future Research  
 
It is well-known that manufacturers use multiple control mechanisms to manage 
their downstream channel members. Based on the institutional context in which a leading 
local manufacturer of a key computer accessory in China operates and using the company 
data, this dissertation aimed to examine the creation, extent, and role of economic rent in 
distribution contracts. As were outlined in the introductory section, I defined three 
specific goals: 
(1) to show how the two-stage ordering process adopted by various manufacturers 
and industries enables an upstream firm to endogenously determine the 
intensity of downstream competition and thus affect the economic rents earned 
by its dealers; 
(2) to estimate the extent of downstream rent by linking the game theoretic results 
to the data I collected from the accessory manufacturer; and 
(3) to empirically investigate the complementarity between economic rent and 
supervisor in inducing the supply of non-contractible dealer effort. 
These goals have been addressed in Chapters, 2, 3, and 4, respectively. In the reminder of 
this section, I will discuss the limitations of this dissertation and look forward to future 
research that could be built upon my theoretical and empirical findings.  
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First, Chapter 2’s theoretical model looks at how the two-stage process affects 
downstream outcomes by assuming quantity discount as the only choice variable for the 
manufacturer. I linked the results of the model to the Computec data and then estimated 
the amount of downstream economic rent which, in turn, allows me to empirically 
explore the relationship between rent and supervision in Chapter 4. As we saw in the 
latter chapter, nevertheless, the manufacturer also decides on its supervision intensity, in 
addition to affecting the amount of downstream rent through quantity discount. A 
meaningful extension of the game theoretical model will be to include both quantity 
discount and supervision intensity in the two-stage ordering process. This would provide 
a more accurate account of Computec’s control system on the one hand and to generate 
testable hypotheses related to the interdependence between the amount of downstream 
profit and supervision intensity on the other hand.  
Another limitation related to the game theoretic model is that it only includes 
three players, one manufacturer and two dealers. Permitting inter-brand competition and 
allowing each manufacturer to have more than two dealers would improve the realism of 
the model49. Another extension would be to permit dealers to carry inventories from one 
ordering cycle to the next as the year progresses. Uncertain demand and inventory carry-
over are not decision-making drivers in the computer accessory channel that I considered; 
but they can be important factors that affect competition outcomes in other contexts such 
as the fashion apparel industry. To study those situations, modeling uncertainty would be 
a worthwhile undertaking. Most importantly, in future work I plan to compare formally 
                                                 
49 This is not problematic in my case because all of Computec’s major competitors, regardless of size, use a 
qualitatively similar two-stage ordering process with their dealers.  As such, strategic inter-brand rivalry 
motives are less likely to explain the adoption of this practice.  
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the two-stage ordering process to alternative institutions which the manufacturer chose 
not to adopt.  
Due to the limited panel, I could only estimate the unobserved prices at the 
regional level in Chapter 3. Moreover, since there is no data under alternative 
mechanisms like pure Bertrand and with quantity discounts, I was constrained to infer the 
effectiveness of the two-stage process by comparing my results with anecdotal evidence. 
In the future, data collection efforts should be extended to panel data that covers multiple 
regimes and longer periods of time. This enables individual-level estimations and 
investigating counterfactuals. Such data would also permit me to structurally estimate the 
outcomes of the two-stage process per the theoretical model.  
The empirical findings on the complementarity between economic rent and 
supervision call for extending the self-enforcement and efficiency-wage theories. 
Evidence suggests that the desired level of dealer effort would be affected by the 
intensities of dealer profit and supervisory effort in a continuous fashion. Future theoretic 
work on self-enforcement should take account of both the endogeneity and continuity 
nature of dealer effort. Furthermore, since an upstream firm’s supervisory efforts are part 
of the joint effort which helps to increase the productivity of its downstream members, 
supervision itself brings in intrinsic value, on top of its disciplinary function, to induce 
desired outcomes. This implies that in ongoing bilateral relationships, supervision is not a 
discrete event that directly and immediately links to relationship termination when 
dealers are caught non-compliant. As rightly noted by Alchian and Demsetz (1972), it 
would be very difficult to separate the multiple functions of supervision. Therefore, 
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production or “outcome” functions should incorporate the productive nature of 
manufacturer’s supervision50.   
As with any case study, my findings are set in the institutional context I described 
in this dissertation. Although both the two-stage ordering process and the rent-
supervision complementarity were found to achieve their respective purposes in my data, 
the effectiveness of these mechanisms in general would depend on the specific 
institutional settings in which the economic players operate. I encourage future research 
to look at broader inter-firm and/or cross-industry contexts in order to provide more 
generalizable insights related to economic rent.  
Finally, studying issues related to economic rent is both important and 
challenging. It is important because, as theory suggests and my dissertation showed, 
leaving downstream rent can motivate dealers to perform. It  is challenging because there 
is a lack of formal theory regarding economic rent and its relationship to self-enforcing 
contracts; in addition, empirical analyses require extremely detailed firm level data. As 
insights accumulate on the economic rationale for leaving downstream rent, it will 
become possible to give more valuable advice to companies about how to organize their 
distribution activities efficiently and to antitrust authorities about how to formulate more 
effective competition policies.  
                                                 
50 Extending classical agency theory, Bhattarchayya and Lafontaine (1995) include efforts of both the 
principal and the agent in the production function to look at double-sided hazard in share contracts. This 
would be a good starting point for the extension I mentioned here.   
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FIGURE 2: SEQUENCE OF MOVES 
  
Dealers simultaneously make (and pay for) orders based 
on manufacturer’s quantity discount schedule 
Dealers receive shipped orders. Amounts of orders become 
common knowledge. Dealers simultaneously set prices to 
maximize profits. They can order additional units. Dealer may 
not return any unsold units for refunds. 
Stage 2 
Stage 1 
The profit-maximizing manufacturer announces a linear quantity-
discount schedule Stage 0 
Note: dealers’ demand functions are common knowledge throughout the game.  
Computec announces 
schedule of quantity 




place orders and 
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FIGURE 3: DEALER i’S PRICING DECISION IN STAGE 2 
 
 






















FIGURE 5: DEALER i’S PREORDERING DECISION IN STAGE 1 
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TABLE 2: SUMMARY STATISTICS – TRANSACTIONAL DATA 
Variables 
Number of 
Observations Mean SD 
Monthly quantity, in ’000 720 41.28 86.69
Net (after-discount) wholesale price  720 1410.82 72.18
Manufacturer’s subsidy, in million Y$ 720 0.034 0.15 
Marketing expenses at regional level, in million Y$ 96 0.030 0.14 
Advertising expenses at country level, in million Y$ 12 3.94 3.48 
Public relations expenses at country level, in million 12 5.17 3.83 
Wholesale market price of competing manufacturer 1 12 1221.17 33.90
Wholesale market price of competing manufacturer 2 12 1185.75 27.89




TABLE 3: PAIRWISE CORRELATIONS – TRANSACTIONAL DATA 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. Quantity (‘000) -  
2. Net wholesale price -0.41* -  
3. Wholesale market price – competitor 1 0.03 -0.24* -  
4. Wholesale market price – competitor 2 0.06 0.06 -0.24* - 
5. Wholesale market price – competitor 3 -0.00 0.17* -0.71* 0.14* -
6. Ad expenses (mil Y$) 0.14* -0.14* 0.74* -0.18* -0.53* -
7. PR expenses (mil Y$) 0.02 -0.07 0.42* 0.07 -0.47* 0.13* -
8. Regional marketing expenses (mil Y$) 0.32* -0.04 -0.11* 0.17* 0.09* 0.06 -0.15* -
9. Manufacturer’s subsidy (mil Y$) 0.20* -0.11* 0.02 0.07 0.06 0.12* -0.07 -0.05 -
  *significant at 0.05. 
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TABLE 4: DEMAND ESTIMATION: POOLED NATIONAL ESTIMATES 
Dependent Variable: Quantity (in ’000) 
Independent Variables (1) (2) 




Competing dealers’ price   0.26*** 
(0.10) 




























Sales cycle effects  Yes*** Yes*** 
    
R2  0.24 0.25 
Error autocorrelation  No No 
Endogenous own price  No No 
Endogenous “dealer marketing”  No No 
Observations  720 720 
Number of Dealers  60 60 
‡ in million Y$. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses.  
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Testing strict endogeneity and error term correlation follow the procedure specified in Wooldridge 
(2002) on p.284-285 and p.275 respectively. See also Cameron and Trivedi (2005, p.276). The 




TABLE 5: DEMAND ESTIMATION: POOLED REGIONAL ESTIMATES  
Dependent Variable: Quantity (in ’000) 
























































































National-level PR‡  
2.56*** 
(.63) 
Sales cycle effects  Yes*** 
R2   .33 
Number of Dealers  11 7 11 3 10 4 8 6
‡ in million Y$. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10,** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 




TABLE 6: ESTIMATED FINAL PRICES BY REGION 
 Final Prices (Y$) 
Region Mean SD 
(1) Beijing 1511.72 38.72 
(2) Northeast 1690.60 51.82 
(3) North  1749.36 52.93 
(4) Northwest  1732.53 75.20 
(5) East  1580.29 33.48 
(6) South  1612.41 52.78 
(7) Central  1860.52 88.26 
(8) Southwest  1626.36 103.22 
National average  1663.31 126.83 
  
 
TABLE 7: ESTIMATED GROSS AND NET ECONOMIC RENT 
  Gross Rent† Net Rent‡ 
Region  Mean SD Mean SD 
(1) Beijing  11.86 12.89 7.67 9.65 
(2) Northeast  3.56 2.56 2.13 2.03 
(3) North  2.88 2.03 1.40 1.85 
(4) Northwest  7.21 9.69 5.10 9.66 
(5) East  6.03 7.49 4.08 8.40 
(6) South  11.71 13.60 8.61 10.01 
(7) Central  7.09 5.70 6.00 5.26 
(8) Southwest  3.33 2.65 2.61 2.94 
National 
average 
 6.54 8.18 4.48 6.78 





itititi q)ω-p(Π ˆ . 
‡Net rent is calculated by i
12
1t











NE N NW Cen-
tral 
SW 
City-level per capita 
GDP (US$) 
2345 1929 1930 1188 1379 1117 1213 1170 
Growth rate of GDP 11.63 11.16 7.78 11.14 11.57 10.75 10.31 9.15 
Growth rate of telecom 20.49 23.98 19.87 19.30 24.42 23.78 22.49 21.21
Growth rate of car 
ownership 
12.49 16.20 13.05 13.31 14.97 16.50 14.49 12.18
Source: China Provincial Statistics Yearbook (2005, 2006) 
 




Profit Economic rent earned by dealer in 2005 (mil Y$) 
 
Supervision Number of hours the regional manager works with dealer each 
month in the following five marketing tasks: customer training, 
POP materials handing, organizing customer conference, 





Number of hours per month dealer (regional manager’s 
counterpart) spends in the following four tasks: customer 
training, POP materials handling, organizing customer 
conference, and customer relationship building 
 
Dealer Size Sales revenue in previous year (2004; mil Y$) 
 




Number of competing brands carried by dealer (excluding 
Computec) 
 
Income Level GDP per capita (2004-5) of the city in which dealer is located 
 
Growth Rate Growth rate (2004-5) in telecommunications at city level 
 
Distance Number of kilometers from base location of regional manager 
 
Subsidy Manufacturer’s subsidy for dealer profitability and marketing 


























*significant at 0.05. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1. Dealer efforts 1.00           
2. Dealer profit 0.49* 1.00          
3. Supervision 0.26 0.32* 1.00         
4. Size 0.11 0.63* 0.13 1.00        
5. Tenure 0.08 0.16 0.13 0.25 1.00       
6. Competing brands -0.06 -0.06 -0.19 0.03 -0.04 1.00      
7. City GDP -0.14 0.30* -0.12 0.27* 0.13 0.12 1.00     
8. Growth rate 0.12 -0.13 0.14 -0.11 -0.13 0.37* -0.06 1.00    
9. Distance 0.09 -0.16 0.07 -0.18 -0.12 -0.20 -0.67* -0.11 1.00   
10. Subsidy 0.40* 0.54* 0.30* 0.33* 0.10 -0.01 -0.07 -0.00 0.07 1.00  
11. Office rents 0.03 0.54* -0.03 0.54* 0.32* -0.02 0.37* -0.08 -0.20 -0.10 1.00 
Mean 39.51 4.55 55.26 390.44 3.66 3.92 1.614 22.09 734.41 0.42 0.16 




TABLE 11: ADOPTION APPROACH 
* p < 0.10,** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. 
 























































TABLE 12: ADOPTION APPROACH – INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES 
Dependent Variable: Manufacturer Supervision Effort 
 * p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses 

















































































































59 59 59 
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TABLE 13: OUTCOME APPROACH 
Dependent Variable: Dealer Marketing Effort 
†p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses  
* p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses 
#Endogenous variables: Profit, (Profit)2, Profit*Supervision. Excluded instrument variables: Office Rent, 
Subsidy, (Office Rent)2, (Subsidy)2, Office Rent*Supervision, Subsidy*Supervision 
‡Endogenous variables: Profit, (Profit)2, Supervision, (Supervision) 2, Profit*Supervision. Excluded 


















































































































































59 59 59 59 
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TABLE 14: OUTCOME APPROACH – MEAN-CENTERED 
Dependent Variable: Dealer Marketing Effort 
*p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. † Mean-centered variables. 
#Endogenous variables: Profit, (Profit)2, Profit*Supervision. Excluded instrument variables: Office Rent, 
Subsidy, (Office Rent)2, (Subsidy)2, Office Rent*Supervision, Subsidy*Supervision 
‡Endogenous variables: Profit, (Profit)2, Supervision, (Supervision) 2, Profit*Supervision. Excluded 
















































































































































No. of observations 59 59 59 59 
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APPENDIX A: BERTRAND AND COURNOT BENCHMARKS 
 
Bertrand Prices, Quantities, and Profits for Dealers 
Solving )w;p(r 2
b
1 and )w;p(r 1
b
2 , I obtain the Bertrand price pair:  





Substituting the prices into the demand functions jiij i,i p bpaq)p(pD +−=≡ , I obtain 
the Bertrand quantities pair: 





Further substituting the prices and quantities into dealer’s profit 
function Bi
B









=− ,   









Cournot Prices, Quantities, and Profits for Dealers 
Cournot prices can be obtained by solving dealer’s profit maximization problem: 
)p bp)))(ap bp(a  d(w(p πmax jijiiip
ii
+−+−−−= , subject to ijj p bpak +−= . 
Substituting the constraint into the profit function and using the first order conditions, I 








   (1)k 2dw;(kr ij
C
i , i = 1, 2; i ≠ j. Using 
Lemma 1 and substituting ijj p bpak +−=  into it, I get the Cournot price reply 












=− , i = 1, 2; i ≠ j. Solving the last 
set of reply functions, the Cournot price pair are given by: 
)d)b2(1bb)(2-(1






=− , i = 1, 2. 
Substituting the prices into the demand function jiij i,i p bpaq)p(pD +−=≡ , the 






=− , i = 1, 2. 









=− , i = 1, 2. 
Critical Discount 
From (w)p )k δ 2(wp Bii
C











=  is the uniquely feasible solution and I call it the critical discount. 








. Therefore, at δ, the Cournot price 
)k  2w(cp i
c
i δ−+ cuts the Bertrand price w)(cp
b
i + from below, which is expected.
90 
APPENDIX B: PROOF OF LEMMA 2 
Notice that the best response function in ki, for i=1,2, is given by ki(kj) = D(pi(kj), 
pj(kj)), where (pi(kj), pj(kj)) satisfies 
(a1)   subject to     k)k dw(p Max iiip
i
⋅+−  
(a2)   ijj p bpak +−=  
(a3)   w);(prp)(pr j
i
ij
i ≤≤ . 
(a2) and (a3) are direct implications from the lemma: ki = qi= Di (pi, pj), for i=1, 2. (a2) 
says that the optimal price response must lie on Part 2 of rival’s reaction function. (a3) 
mandates that the best response price falls between the range that is under the conditions 
of  ki > qi and ki < qi. 
I divide my analysis into three cases: 
(1) d > δ. As I showed in Section 3 and using the lemma, (a1) and (a2) give rise 
the Cournot price )k d 2(wp i
C
i − . )k d 2(wp i
C
i − also satisfies (a3) (see Figure 4). 
)k d 2(wq i
C
i −  is the optimal quantity and by the lemma, this is also the optimal preorder 
size ki in the first stage. Given small discount, specifically with d < 1, the second order 
condition of the constrained optimization problem of (a1) and (a2), i.e. 
0d))(1b2(1 2 <−−− , is also satisfied. Together with the fact that the first order 
condition gives a unique maximum, the optimal solution is unique. The same reasoning is 
also true for the other dealer. Hence, the Cournot price pair 




1 −− is optimal. Dealers’ preorders (ki, kj) that equal the 




1 −−  implement these 
91 
prices. Graphically, Point C is at the intersection of Part 2 of the two reaction functions at 
which each dealer reaches the highest possible Cournot profit.  
(2) 0 < d ≤ δ. At d = δ, the solution to (a1) to (a3) coincides with the intersection 
point of the two curves w);(pr 2
B
1 and w);(pr 1
B
2 , which is the Bertrand price pair 
( (w)p (w),p B2
B
1 ) or point B in Figure 4. For discounts that fall into the range 0 < d ≤ δ, 
dealer i still preorders ki = (w)qBi . A smaller preorder shifts the si curve downward and 
thus its intersection point with w);(pr j
B
i is beneath B. To satisfy (a2), the equilibrium 
point that intersects Part 2 of his rival’s reaction curve lies on Part 3 of his reaction curve; 
in other words the dealer will supplement his preorders in Stage 2. But this contradicts 
the lemma. Notice that at B, the dealer receives the highest possible profit. The same 
reasoning applies to the other dealer. Therefore, preorders (ki, kj) that equal to 
(w))q(w),(q C2
C
1 implement the Bertrand price pair. Note that the total cost of ordering ki is 
ii k)k d (w ⋅−  in the relevant range of discount values. 
(3) Finally at d = 0, the two-stage game is equivalent to a one-stage Bertrand game. 






1  respectively. 
However, the sizes of dealers’ preorders are indeterminate because the Bertrand price can 
be implemented by any preorders with (w)]q[0,k B11 ∈ and (w)].q [0,k
B
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